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Prior to the rise of nationalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, merchants from England, Europe, and elsewhere traversed the
Mediterranean and Atlantic to conduct trade. These merchants resolved
their commercial disputes by referring to business customs that had
evolved within their trades. This group of customs came to be recognized
as the lex mercatoria or the law merchant.
During the seventeenth century, merchants became less transient and
governments took a more dominant role in matters of trade. These and
other sociological factors curtailed the use and growth of the law merchant
as a means of resolving disputes among international merchants.
Although national law continued to endorse the use of customs in
resolving disputes among merchants, the evolution of the law merchant was
limited for nearly two centuries. The rise in commercial arbitration over
the past quarter century and the awards emanating from arbitral tribunals,
however, evidence a resurrection of the law merchant. This modem or
revitalized law merchant has become a source of law for determining
commercial obligations to international contracts.
This article contends that national courts, like modem international
arbitral tribunals, should expand their understanding and reliance on
business customs and trade usages when adjudicating transnational
commercial disputes. Such an approach would more accurately represent
the commercial reality that exists among merchants. Moreover, it would
assist in the revitalization of the law merchant and in the formation of
uniform rules to govern international trade already being developed by
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international arbitrators.
Modem commercial arbitration has had a significant impact on the
international business community. During the past two decades interna-
tional arbitration has become an increasingly favored method for resolving
transnational commercial disputes.' The arbitration alternative, spearhead-
ed by the work of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the
United Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), has
begun to relieve national court dockets of numerous commercial cases
involving merchants of different nation-states. Various reasons have been
suggested to explain the expanding use of international arbitration rather
than traditional courts of law.2 One of the more compelling explanations
credits the expansion of arbitration to the merchants' wariness of submit-
ting their commercial interests to foreign law or to an unfamiliar legal
system that may possess vested parochial interests.
3 
Thus, in order to
avoid the risk of protracted litigation before a foreign court, merchants
have regularly chosen to adjudicate their commercial disputes before one
of the various international arbitration tribunals.
Of the many contributions the international arbitration system has
made to furthering economic relations, perhaps the most important is its
role in the development of a uniform body of law governing international
commerce.4 Recent scholars have noted that certain rules of law have
1. To illustrate, the increase in aebitral adjudications under the International Chamber of
Commerce increased nearly four fold from 1962 to 1982. W. CRAIo, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON,
INTERNATIONAL CH MBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION, pt. I, § 1.02, at 3 (1984); see Haight,
International Arbitration, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L . 253 (1982).
2. A few reasons include: cost, publicity, procedural informalities, professional competence
of the arbitrators, confidentiality, maintenance of amicable business relationships, and gaining
jurisdiction over parties, such us state entities. See generally de Vries, International
Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Court, 57 TUL. L. REv. 42, 43
(1982); van den Houen, Commercial Disputes and Their Settlement a Factor in Business
Planning, in INT'L CHAMBER COM., 60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION, A LOOK AT THE FUTURE
39, 40 (1984); M. DoMsE, INTERONnoiAL TeAs ARITRATtON: A ROAD TO WORLD-WIDE
CooPRrtIoN (1958); Dlaume, Arbitration with Governments: 'Domestic' v. 'International'
Awards, 17 INT'L LAW. 657 (1983); W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 1, pt. Ill,
§ 12.03, at 29. For a discussion of the difficulty of maintaining jurisdiction over state agencies
in the United States under the "Act of State Doctrine," see generally Rendell, The Allied Bank
Case and Its Afteranath, 20 INT'L LAw. 819 (1986).
3. See Berman & Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex
Mercatoria), 19 HARV. hr'L L.J. 221, 274-77 (1978); de Vriens, supra note 2, at 64; Houzhi,
Arbitration A Method Used by China to Settle Foreign Trade and Economic Disputes, 4 PACE
L. Rev. 519, 519-20 (1984); Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational Arbitration: The
English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 HARV. INT'L L.I. 87, 122-23 (1980).
4. Described as a "common law of international transactions," arbitral adjudieations have
become central to the development of transeational commercial law. See generally W. CRAIG,
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taken on an international character and are being employed by arbitrators
when resolving transnational disputes. Some of the principles upon which
international arbitrators have regularly relied include, inter alia, the duties
to bargain in good faith, to mitigate damages, and to renegotiate contracts,
as well as numerous maritime issues.5 These principles and other substan-
tive pronouncements by international arbitrators are based upon a
developed body of international precedents, similar to traditional common
law jurisprudence.
6
Since arbitral awards refer to business custom, international commer-
cial arbitration plays a significant role in unifying commercial law. The
fimal award must take into consideration the terms of the contract and the
established trade usages or customs in the given commercial area.' This
procedure differs from traditional legal analysis, where, in the absence of
an express choice, a court normally attempts to determine the law which
properly governs by applying the lex fori and restricts the influence of
custom and usage in rendering decisions.
The process of adjudication currently invoked by international
arbitrators is an aggressive step toward developing a common law of
international commercial transactions. With the continuing expansion of
W. PaRK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 1, pt. 1, § 1.06, at 10 (2d ed. 1990); Carboooeau,
Rendering Arbitrl Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International
Transactions, 23 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579 (1985); Cremades, The Impact oflnternational
Arbitration on the Development of Business Law, 31 AM. J. COMe. L. 526 (1983); Cremades
& Plebn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International
Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT'L L.1. 317 (1984); Note, A Modern Lex Mercatoria
Political Rhetoric or Substantive Progress?, 3 BROOKLvN I. INT'L L. 210 (1977).
5. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & . PAULSSON, supra note 1, pt. II, § 5.02, at 62 (2d ed. 1990);
Carbonneau, spra note 4, at 591; Ccemades, upra note 4, at 527; O'Brien, Maritime
Arbitration, 14 FORUM 222, 227 (1978-79).
6. Precedents involving issues, such as damages, unf'oeseeobility,force majore, survival of
contractual obligations, pacte sunt servanda, and other questions also enjoy international status.
See generally W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 1, pt. VI, § 35.02, at 621-32 (2d
ed. 1990); Berman, Eccuse for Non-Performance in the Light of Contract Practices in
International Trade, 63 CoLuM. L. REV. 1413 (1963); Cremnades, supro note 4, at 530-31;
Rapsomoldkis, Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative Law, 18
DuQ. L. REV. 551 (1986).
7. ICC Rule 13(5) states: "In all cases the arbitrator shall talke account of the provisions of
the contract and the relevant trade usages." UNCITRAL article 33 ascribes to the arbitrator
powers similar to those contained in ICC Rule 13(3) with regard to selecting the proper law to
govern the contract. Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Rules, however, mandates that the express
agreement supersedes trade usages as the controlling law, whereas ICC Rule 13(5) places the
agreement and trade customs on "equal footing." See Stein & Wotman, International
Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison f the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules,
38 Bus. LAw. 1685, 1714 n.184 (1983).
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international trade and the interdependence of national economies, the
development of a body of commercial law-void of parochial interests-is
a vital component for regulating commerce. The establishment of
international standards to govern commercial transactions will serve to
enhance trade by providing merchants a more uniform, anational legal
system of dispute resolution!
t
The developments in international arbitration have had a significant
impact on the growth of the law governing commercial transactions.
However, international arbitral adjudications, while increasing, are not
numerous enough to create an established uniform law of international
transactions. This Article proposes that national courts adopt a more
flexible approach in applying business customs and trade usages in cases
involving international commercial transactions, thereby assisting the
development of transnational law.
Part I of this Article examines the development of the law merchant
as a model illustrating the feasibility of a modem international law of
commercial transactions. This section also explores the ways in which
substantive guidelines of the major arbitral institutions and significant
decisions rendered by international arbitrators have succeeded in fostering
a modem, anational approach to international commercial dispute
resolution.
Part II tracks the development of the law merchant in England from
its introduction into English jurisprudence to its absorption into the
common law and its impact on national law. This examination centers on
the law merchant's influence on the commercial law of England and the
loss of flexibility that arose with the incorporation of the law merchant into
domestic law.
Part I reviews the history of the law merchant in American
jurisprudence, analyzing statutory and case law relating to trade usages in
modern commercial litigation.
Part IV reviews the interrelationship between the law merchant and the
proper law doctrine as adhered to in most common law jurisdictions. The
text concludes by arguing that national courts should show greater
8. The fractured nature of the contemporary world's political and legal organization
sharply contrasts with the increasingly transnational character of its economy.
Intereational businesses operate as did the medieval merchants whose trade
transcended the patchwork of local sovereignties.... Supranational law based on
customs affords greater flexibility than either national legislation or international
conventions, since the domestic legislative process inevitably brings into play
interests removed from those of international commerce.
W. CIto, W. PAntK & J. PAuLssoN, supra note I, pt. VI, §§ 35.01-02, at 3; see Cremades,
supra note 4, at 528. See generally supra note 4.
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deference to trade usage and custom, including law merchant principles,
when deciding transoational commercial disputes.
H. LEx MERCATORIA
A. The Genesis of a Universal Commercial Law
The establishment of a uniform body of law to govern international
commercial disputes has been an objective of merchants for centuries prior
to the Christian era.
9 
With the development of the Rhodian Code,
sometime between 300 and 900 B.C., the pristine formation of mercantile
law began to expand beyond local practices to take on an international
flavor. Much of the substantive commercial developments came to be
recognized as the lex mercatoria (the law merchant), the origins of which
could be traced to the ancient mariners who travelled the Mediterranean.
The law merchant eventually gained a foothold throughout Europe and the
United Kingdom and addressed a myriad of substantive, procedural, and
evidentiary matters.'
0
Much of the progress toward the establishment of uniform commercial
law initially came in the field of admiralty or maritime law. During the
third and fourth centuries B.C., the Isle of Rhodes emerged as a primary
center for international trade. Not only did the Rhodians use their
exceptional navigational skills to market their goods as far as Spain, but
they also developed their own ports into hives of mercantile activity, due
largely to their location between Greece, Egypt, and Western Europe."
As a result of the enhanced commercial activity in and around Rhodes,
business "necessity" and "convenience" led to the adoption and propaga-
tion of flexible customs-in lieu of a single municipal law-to govern
9. For an historical perspective of early comomercial law, see generally J. REDDIE, AN
HISTORICAL Vimw OF THE LAW OF MARInME CoMMERCE (1841); Benedict, The Historical
Position of the Rhodian Law, 18 YALE LI.J 223 (1909).
10. W. BEwES, THE RoMANcE OF THE LAw MERCHANT 14 (1923); 0. KEETON, ENGLISH
LAW: THE JUDICIAL COsr1tOrto 171-95 (1974); Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 132, 135-38 (1934).
The law merchant governed a special class of people (merchants) in special places
(fairs, markets, and seaperts). It was distinct from local, feudal, royal, and
ecclesiastical law. Its special characteristics were that 1) it was tcansnational; 2) its
principal source was mercantile custom; 3) it was administered not by professional
judges but by merchants themselves; 4) its procedure was speedy and informal; and
5) it stressed equity, in the medieval sense of fairness, as an overriding principle.
Benoan & Kauffman, supra note 3, at 225.
11. J. REnDt, supra note 9, at 64-65.
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commercial activities. Thus, merchants, regardless of their national origin,
adjudicated various maritime and commercial matters before the Rhodian
Courts.
2
As the law merchant progressed through the first millenium, it
developed a separate identity from any one national system. Until the
close of the Middle Ages, Roman and Canon law affected the law
merchant. This influence stemmed from the trading practices of the
Church and, to a lesser degree, the hegemonic force of the Roman Empire
and Roman law. Even during these times, however, the impact of Roman
law was minor because business dealings continued to "res[t] on mutual
confidence and good faith to an extent unknown in civil life." 3
By the end of the eleventh century, the law merchant took on a more
substantive and formalized role among traders. This was evidenced by the
major development of that period-the Tablets of Amalphi. The rules
emanating from the Italian republic of Amalphi were memorialized in a
code of sea laws much more complete than the Rhodian laws or others of
the Middle Ages.'
4 
Located on the Tyrrhenian Sea, Amalphi extended the
authority of its sea codes over "a broad zone of the southern Tyrrhenian
Littoral."
5 
Merchants and mariners throughout the Mediterranean made
"general recourse" to the "wise laws" of Amalphi.'
Following the development of the Amalphian codes, the Court of
Oleron, situated on an island in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of France,
became the next significant source of international maritime law. The
collection of maritime judgments decreed by the Court of Oleron estab-
lished a group of precedents that had a controlling influence over admiralty
12. See id. at 69-70.
mhese laws, like the greatest part of the common or consuetudinary laws of other
nations, grew up in the shape of customs and usages, from feelings of necessity and
considerations of convenience, and came to be recogni[zled and enforced by their
coons ofjustice, more from a general tacit consent than from any express or special
legislative enactment.
Id. at 67-68.
13. W. BEWES, supra note 10, at 9. Even though Roman law was highly organized,
structured, and codified, trade law in the Mediterranean region generally obviated the Roman
legal infrastructure, which regulated domestic events. This was also true in English law as the
law merchant initially formed "a distinct branch of law, and not [a) past of the common law."
See I W. HOLDSWORT, A HisTORy OF ENGLsH LAw 539 (7th ed. 1956 & reprint 1966).
14. See generally G. G.MoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY 4-5 (2d ed. 1975).
15. ld at 6 n.16 (citing L. SENIGALLIA, TABULA DE AMALPHA 31 (1934)).
16. 4 THE BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMIRALTY s-xi (T. Twin ed. 1876 & reprint 1985). It
also is recorded that in 1178 A.D., the sovereign of Jerusalem allowed the resident merchants
from Amalphi to have their disputes settled "by their own consuls according to their own good
customs.. ." Id
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disputes throughout the entire western coast of Europe up to the North Sea.
The judgments arising out of Oleron eventually had a significant impact on
English admiralty law.
7
The English government played an important role in promoting Oleron
as a center for international dispute resolution. Queen Eleanor granted the
first charter to the island, followed by King John's grant of a commune in
1199 A.D." The judgments were later compiled under the authority of
the Crown (Richard 1)." The establishment and development of the
Court of Oleron was significant in that the British Crown not only
countenanced the growth of a separate transnational law in an English
tribunal, but also furthered the application of an anational law to English
citizens and foreigners alike. As noted by one commentary:
So far there is unimpeachable evidence that before the Admiral's
jurisdiction was established in England, and the decisions of
questions of contract and tort on the high seas was assigned to the
Admiral's Court, there were courts in England whose province it
was to administer a common Law Marine to foreign equally as to
British merchants and mariners.
2
'
One final consortium of rules that possessed transnational character
was the Consulato del Mare compiled in the fourteenth century.2' These
customary rules were eventually printed in Italian, French, Latin, Dutch,
and German' and "ascended as an internationally recognized body of
mercantile custom" that had significance throughout the Mediterranean."
17. G. MALYNES, CONSuruDo, VEL, LEx MERcATORA: OR, THE ANcIENT LAW-
MERCHANT, pt 1, at 87 (1685); see 4 THE BLACK BOOK OF THE ADnRALTY, sapra note 16,
at lxsxviii-cxxxiv.
18. 2 THE BLACK BOOK OF THE ADMtRALTY, supra note 16, at xxv. "[T]he magistracy of
the commane consisted of a mayor, a pro-mayor, echevins, and prod' homes...." ld at xxx.
19. Several theories exist to explain the collection and publication of these Laws of the Seas.
/d at xlvii-lix.
20. Id at xxxvii (emphasis added). The commentary continues by noting the facts that
[N]ot merely... [was] them... a cort at Oleron which administered the Law Maritime, and
that its judgments were considered by the prud'hommes of the commune to be of such
impotance that they were placed by them on record amongst the good judgments and good
customa and good usages of their ancestors, but that mariners of other countries were in the
habit of resorting to the court at Oleron for the sake of obtaining its judgment upon their
disputes.
Id
21, Id. at x-vii.
22. Id. at lix, lxxiii.
23. L. TRACKMAN, THE LAw MERCHANT: THE EVOLUT1ON F COMmasccAL Aw 8 (1983).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMw. L.
B. The Fair Courts
Although the evolution of the various sea codes and maritime customs
assisted in the development of a multinational consensus as to maritime
law, and, to a lesser degree, general commercial law, the more salient
developments of the law merchant were tied to the burgeoning fairs,
markets, and other land-based trading emporiums held throughout the
medieval period. Between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries,
international fairs flourished on both the Continent and in England. These
fairs made the most significant contributions to the law merchant and the
unification of commercial law.'e
The medieval fairs of Europe and England were quite extraordinary
events, attracting traders from not only the United Kingdom and Europe,
but also Africa, Russia, and the Middle East. As Bewes comments:
The Venetian and Genoese merchant came with his previous
stock of eastern produce, his Italian silks and velvets. The
Flemish weaver was present with his linens of Liege and Ghent.
The Spaniard came with his stock of iron, the Norwegian with his
tar and pitch. The Gaston winegrower was ready to trade in the
produce of his vineyards; and more rarely, the vintages of Greece
were also supplied.'
The annual fairs took place in various locations, including Stourbridge,
England; Champagne, France; Novgorod, Russia; and Arabia.
26 
Typical-
ly, the fairs were private undertakings, with little government intervention.
Indeed, the state facilitated the proceedings by respecting the international
nature of the events and allowing transnational rules to govern disputes
arising between the merchants. The national sovereign, however, was
instrumental in establishing the infrastructure of the fairs, especially in
England.
In England, the Crown granted franchises to initiate the fairs and
The Consulato del Mar contained 'the common law of all the commercial powers of Europe
.... 3 THE BtAc BOOK OI THE AIRALTv, supra note 16, at xxvi-xyji. Other
significant mercantile laws emanated from Pisa, Genoa, and other loealm. See generally H.
BERMAtN, LAW & REVOLUtnON: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADTION 354-56
(1983). Similarly, the Laws of Wisby were of paramount imporance in the Baltic region. See
4 THo BLACK BOOK OF TE ADMItALTY, supra note 16, at xtiii-xxvii.
24. See supra note 23.
25. W. BewEs, supra note 10, at 94.
26. Id. at 93-97.
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guaranteed safe passage to all participants.27 In return, the sovereign
gained direct economic benefits through the excise of tolls, and indirect
benefits as a result of significant international trade within its bound-
aries." The Crown was instrumental in establishing the fair courts
through the granting of the franchise; however, the government neither
interfered with the application of the law merchant nor mandated that
domestic law play a role in resolving disputes between the traders?"
Thus, the law merchant evolved, unfettered by national sovereigns."
Regardless of location, each fair had its own court that heard
numerous commercial disputes arising among the participating mer-
chants.3 The courts had jurisdiction over civil cases, irrespective of the
amount in controversy,- 2 and, to a lesser extent, criminal matters.33 The
courts conducted hearings throughout the day and night. More important,
although the Crown would appoint an individual to serve as judge to guide
the proceedings, the juries consisted of fellow merchants present at the
fair.' These juries would render swift justice, based on the law mer-
chants; there was no right of appeal."
The judgments emanating from the fair courts nurtured the growth of
the law merchant. The law merchant continued to evolve throughout
England and Europe, reaching its zenith between the fourteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Throughout this period the law merchant maintained
27. See Note, supra note 4, at 23.
28. 1 W. HOLDswORTr, supra note 13, at 535.
29. Id.
30. Jones adds: "frhe law merehant's] development throughout Europe was quite similar.
This was natural since merchants at the time formed a European community that was in many
ways interational-especially in England where almost all foreign trade was in the hands of
aliens, chiefly Germans, and Italians. Jones, An Inquiry into the History of Adjudication of
Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the United States 25 U. CH. L. REv. 445, 448 (1958)
(citing 1 E. Lt'SON, EcoNOtsatc HtsTORY Or EN.AND 448-71 (5th ed. 1929)).
31. See 1 W. HOLDsWORT, supra note 13, at 536.
32. Id (citing 23 SELtsc SOC'Y: 1 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAw MERCANT, A.D.
1270-1638: LOCAL CouRTs uxiv (C. Gross ed. 1908 & reprint 1974) [hereinafter SELDEN
Soc'Y]). The fair courts should not be confused with the staple courts. Staple courts were
municipal courts, usually located at a port of entry regulating the trade of staples such as tin
and wool. These courts were somewhat akin to modem customs courts. Jones, supra note 30,
at 448. A. KsAaLrv, POTTER'S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LAw 190 (4th ed.
1958).
33. See I W. HoLDSWORT, supra note 13, at 536. The docket contained some significant
cases, including horse stealing. See SetsoN Soc's. supra note 32, at 25-26.
34. 1 W. HoLDswoRTK, supra note 13, at 536.
35. G. MALY SNE sapra note 17, at 337-38; Jones, supra note 30, at 448.
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three important characteristics: first, it was universal among the traders of
Europe and England; second, it was transportable; and third, it remained
separate from municipal or national laws.' This last point requires some
elucidation.
The law merchant was dissimilar to any single body of national law.
The components of national law often include statutes, codes, regulations,
and case law that result in legal rules and precedents. Although certain
aspects of the law merchant maintained precedential value, as the various
customs or decisions were compiled (as in Oleron or Wisby), the law
merchant had its basis in informal and equitable commercial customs that
prevailed among merchants, rather than on strictly enumerated rules of
law.
7 
Customs changed as rapidly as business practices dictated, unlike
legislative enactments, which were subject to legislative debate and other
rigors of the legislative process. The law merchant contributed to the
development of international trade. Moreover, its application resulted in
an outgrowth of uniform, anational norms.t
Although the formal breakdown of the traditional law merchant did not
occur until the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, national
sovereigns had already begun their encroachment upon the law merchant
by the late fifteenth century. For example, a 1477 English statute imposed
limitations upon the fair courts, restricting them to hearing only those
matters that transpired on the fair grounds during the period of the fair.
39
The Statute of 1477 resulted from the rising competition for jurisdic-
tion over commercial cases among the various branches of English courts.
This competition contributed to the absorption of the law merchant into
36. E. JENxS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 40 (3d ed. 1924); Note, supra note 4,
at 212. Trackman concludes that "Ithe Law Merchant... Sought to provide merchants with
a uniform system of commercial law to resolve their disputes." L. TRACKMAN, supra note 235,
at 13.
37. "In choosing between legal formalities and commercial usage, the need for speed of
adjudication thereby forced commercial judges to promote the immediate concerns of the traders
themselves, rather than to indulge in detailed deliberations within the environment of a formal
courtroom." L. TRACKMAN, supra note 23, at 13.
38. Issues involving, inter alia, parol evidence, oral contracts, agency, interest rates, good
faith bargaining, partnership roles, property transfers, liens, and evidentiary rules developed their
own legal identity and contained a certain flexibility within the law merchant that was
nonexistent in national laws. See W. BEwns, supra note 10, at 19-25; Carbonneau & Firestone,
Transnational Lav-Making: Assessing the Impact of the Vienna Convention and the Viability
ofArbitralAdjudicatin, I EMORY J. INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 51, 60-61 (1986).
39. 17 Edw. 4, ch. 2 (1477). This contrasted an earlier practice of the English fair courts
to hear controversies that originated beyond the fair grounds. See 1 W. HoLDSWORTH, supra
note 13, at 536; F. SANBORN, ORIGINS Or THE EARLY ENGLISH MARTIME AND COMMERCIAL
LAw 354 (1930).
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national law.' The incorporation was also symptomatic of other social
and economic forces, including the rise of nationalism throughout Europe
and England.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both England and the
various nations of Europe experienced a rise in nationalism. England's
growing economy and navy established it as the world's hegemonic power
by the end of the seventeenth century. Consequently, England exerted
greater influence over economic affairs and likewise sought to have a
stronger voice in dictating the legal rules governing commerce. As one
group of commentators suggests, "[a]s a body of customary law pleaded
by merchants and implicit in jury verdicts, the law merchant was hardly
suited for a commercial power, which England became in the eighteenth
century." 4'
Other factors also contributed to the breakdown of the law merchant.
By the close of the seventeenth century, merchants were becoming more
stationary, choosing to conduct international trade by shipping, in lieu of
annual fairs. In addition, traditional courts of law and national legisla-
tures, especially in England, began to recognize the importance of custom
in facilitating the resolution of commercial disputes.43
The incorporation of usages and customs into municipal law added a
barrier to the "adaptation of law to new economic circumstances,"" and
merchants began to shun the courts, opting for informal negotiation and
arbitration as alternatives for resolving disputes.3 Due to these various
developments, the growth of transnational legal principles was stunted
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, even those
portions of the law merchant that found their way into public statutes of
the common and civil law took on the "myopic prism of national
adjudicatory sovereignty" that placed a national taint on a formally
anational legal regime." The law merchant followed a similar course of
incorporation in the United States and throughout Europe.
4
40. T. PLucKNErr, A CoNcIse HIsToRy OF THE COMMON LAw 666-72 (5th ed. 1956). See
inra text accompanying notes 125-247 for a more detailed discussion of the incorporation of
the law merchant into the English common law.
41. Berman & Kanfman, supra note 3, at 226.
42. Jones, supra note 30, at 451.
43. See id, at 445-51.
44. Berean & Kaufmaan, supra note 3, at 228.
45. Jones, supra note 30, at 455-56; Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law,
37 YALE L.J. 595-98 (1928).
46. Carbosreau & Firestone, supra note 38, at 62.
47. See Berman & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 227-28; see infta text accompanying notes
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C. Modern Attempts to Unify Transnational Commercial Law
During the past twenty-five years, there has been a resurgence in
international trade both on a regional and global scale. After a lull in trade
during two world wars, the past three decades have witnessed significant
mercantile activity.
48 
England stood as the world's dominant economic
force in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, followed by the
United States after World War I. Today, however, no single nation
possesses the economic strength to dictate the terms of trade. The impact
of international commerce and trade law on national economies has
significant geopolitical components.49 For this and other reasons, the
trade phenomenon has not gone unnoticed by national governments,
merchants, or jurists. These groups have begun to look to transnational,
rather than national, solutions to regulate the growing number of intema-
tional transactions.
The establishment of the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT) and the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNC1TRAL) were early manifestations of the
international resolve for enacting uniform laws of commerce. In 1965, the




48. The expansion in trade has undergone both qualitative and quantitative changes. Some
of the qualitative changes include the change from economies based on "mature industries" to
service-based economies. Similarly, although trade across the Atlantic remains significant, the
Pacific Rim has become a dominant international economic unit led by Japan, Taiwan, and
Korea. The modernization objectives of the Peoples Republic of China should also strenghten
the importance of the region as an economic force in the future.
49. See Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Small Aidfor Trade,
58 TUL. L. REv. 1107,1137-39 (1984). Seegenerally Barcot6, Subsidiesr, Countervailing Duties
andAntidumping After the Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 257 (1980).
50. General Assembly Resolution 210 provided in pertinent part that
Recalling that it is one of the purposes of the United Nations to be a cedtre for
harmonizing the actions of natioms in the attainment of such common cnds as the
achievement of international ro-opeestion in solving, inter alia, international
economic problems....
Considering, that conflicts and divergencies arising from the laws of different States
in matters relating to international trade constitute an obstacle to the development
of world trade,
Believing that the interests of all peoples, and particularly those of developing
countries, demand the betterment of conditions favouring the extenive development
of international trade,
Recognizing the efforts made by the United Nations ad the specialized agencies, and by
inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, towards the progressive
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conjunction with these efforts, various nations, based on their geographic
proximity, similarity in economic systems, or levels of economic develop-
ment, commenced work with the aim of unifying commercial law.
5
'
Similarly, private enterprise, through trade associations, have developed
standardized contracts and definitional terms in an effort to make
transactions more uniform.
52
The combined efforts both of public and private entities have led to
recent significant advancements in harmonizing international commercial
law. Much effort has been directed toward unifying commercial law
through legislation. However, significant gains from a judicial, or more
precisely, quasi-judicial source, have also been realized through the
development and growth of international commercial arbitration.
unification and harmonization of the law of international trade by promoting the adoption
of international conventions, uniform or model legislation, standard contract provisions,
general conditions of sale, standard trade terms and other measures,
Conincedthat it is desirable to further cooperation among the agencies active in this field
and to explore the need for other measures for the progressive unification and harmoniza-
tion of the law of international trade,
1. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its
twenty-first session a comprehensive report including:
(a) A survey of the work in the field of unification and harmoniation
of the law of international trade;
(b) An analysis of the methods and approaches suitable for the
unification and harmonization of the various topics, including the
question whether particular topics are suitable for regional, inter-re-
gional or world-wide action;
(e) Consideration of the United Nations organs and other agencies
which might be given responsibilities with a view to furthering
co-operation in the development of the law of international trade and to
promoting its progressive unification and harmonization;
2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-first session an item
entitled 'Progressive development of the law of international trade.'
G.A. Res. 2102, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 187, U.N. Doec. A/6014 (1965), reprinted
in 10 D. DJoNovitc, UNrEn NArtoNs REsoLUrTioNs, urn. I, at 187 (1975).
51. Note, supra note 4, at 216-17. See COMECON, Nordic Council & Council of Arab
Unity, in 1 THE EuRoPA YE BanOOK 1981, at 165-69, 232-35. Others include the regional
cents for arbitration at Kuala Lumpar and Cairo, established under the auspices of the
Asian-Afrlcan Legal Consultative Committee, and the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission. See 3 H. Siarr & V. PFcHOrA, THE WORLD ARBrr.AnON REPORTERe 3058-64
(1988).
52. Private organiestions have historically been at the forefront of arbitration efforts in the
United States. See generally Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniforet Commercial Code 10 U.
FLA. L.R. 367, 378 (1957). Actual unification of substantive law, however, was a project of
the individual states. See Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniformn State Laws, 30 LAw & CoNTEMP. ROBs. 233 (1965).
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D. The Rise Of International Commercial Arbitration
There are several reasons behind the recent increase in private
international arbitral adjudications. First, it appears that modem merchants,
like their predecessors of the medieval fair courts, prefer a less formal
methodology to resolve commercial disputes than presently provided
through litigation in national courts. The medieval fair courts resolved
disputes with "speed and informality, low cost and amicability."
53 
These
characteristics are mirrored more in contemporary arbitral tribunals than in
civil proceedings before national courts.
54  
Arbitration provides an
expeditious, informal mechanism for resolving commercial disputes,
without depriving litigants of the substantive fairness offered by municipal
courts. This is evidenced by the fact that international arbitrations are
normally presided over by experts in commerce, rather than eclectic jurists.
In addition, while conventional arbitration awards cannot be rendered in a
matter of hours or days, as were the decisions of the fair courts, interna-
tional arbitral adjudications normally are completed more expeditiously
than traditional civil litigation.
The ICC and UNCITRAL rules also contain specific procedures that
safeguard the parties, ensuring substantive fairness yet still providing great
latitude in determining the conduct of the arbitration.
5 
The increase in
international arbitrations over the past decade and the participants' record
of compliance with those judgments further support the validity of the
process.
5 6
One of the significant areas in which international arbitrations depart
from national court adjudications is in the application of business custom
and usage to disputes involving transnational commercial contracts. When
involved with domestic and international commercial litigation, national
courts are normally bound by the terms of the contract, as interpreted by
the chosen national law; trade usages or course of dealing may be
considered in limited circumstances. In contrast, ICC rule 13(5) instructs
the arbitrator to consider the pertinent commercial usages and customs
common among merchants, regardless of the terms of the contract.
7 
A
53. L. Ts.ACKMAN, supra note 23, at 13.
54. See supra notes 2-3.
55. See ICC Rules 11, 12, 13(3); UNCITRAL Rules 10(1), 11(2), 19(l), 20(t), 22(l) &
28(l).
56. Although not conclusive, only 0.5% of ICC arbitration awards have been set aside, and
only 6% have been challenged in national courts. See W. CRAtG, W. PAR & J. PAueaSON,
spra note 1, at xvi (2d ed. 1990).
57. Id
[Vol. 12
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review of salient customs and trade usages may explain contract provisions
or provide guidance where the terms of the contract or the chosen
substantive law are silent. By resolving disputes on the basis of custom
and trade usage, the tribunals necessarily develop and reinterpret standards
for commercial law. These decisions have gradually coalesced to form an
infantile body of international commercial law.
58
Usages or customs not only may be inferred from traditional law
merchant sources and modem business practices, but also may be inferred
from public and private international accords-even though such agree-
ments do not apply as "a matter of law to the transaction."59  Reference
to custom in modem international arbitrations dates back at least thirty-five
years. Although not free from controversy, awards based on trade
usages or customs have been affirmed by the highest courts in Austria, the
Netherlands, England, and, on a limited basis, France.
61
58. See supra note 4.
59. It should also be noted that various ICC Intercoms, international sales agreements, and
other multi-national accords may act as sources of irananational commercial law. W. CRAIG,
W. PARK & J. PAuisso, supra note 1, pt. III, § 17.03, at 81-82.
[Iln an increasing number of international disputes, arbitrators have determined that
the obligations of the parties are to be determined according to intematianal trade
usages and customs or general principles of law without reference to a special
national law. In many cases such awards may mom nearly establish the real intent
of the parties than would the application of a conflictulist approach which seeks to
impose a single choice of national law.
Id,
60. led pt. Il, § 17.03, at 83 n.37.
61. The Judgment of the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), 8 0b 520/82, of
November 18, 1982, discussed in Melis, Austria 9 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 159 (1984) (Int'l Council
for Com. Arb.), upheld the Arbitral Award of October 26, 1979, ICC No. 3131, in Pabalk
Ticaret Ltd. Sirked v. Nomlaor S.A., reprinted in 9 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 109 [hereinafter PABAL
rIcARJr]. The decision in the Netherlands involved the validity of an anational award nder
the New York Convention. See Commentary, 10 Y.B. Com. ARB. 347 (1985). For the English
decision, see infra text accompanying notes 174-78.
Various municipal arbitration laws also provide for reference to trade customs and general
principles of law in both domestic and international disputes. See, e.g., Issad, Algeria, 4 YB.
CoM. ARB. 3, 16 (1979); Baaghaia, Lybya, 4 Y.B. Com. ARB. 148, 155-56; Goldstojn,
Yugoslavia, 10 Y.B. CoM. AB. 3, 16 (1985); Doi, Japan, 4 Y.B. Com. ARB. 115, 131;
Gloser, Federal Republic of Germany, 4 Y.B. Com. AsB. 60, 73. The eminent United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall once noted:
If, on tracing the right to contract, and the obligations created by contract, to their
source, we find them to exist anterior to, and independent of society, we may
reasonably conclude that those original and pre-existing principles are, like many
other natural rights, brought with man into society; and, although they may be
controlled, are not given by huann legislation.
Ogden v. Saunder, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 345 (1827).
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Although international arbitrations possess many of the characteristics
of domestic arbitrations in terms of informality, speed, and other structural
nuances, the international tribunals are formulating transnational legal
principles in addition to interpreting or applying domestic law. Thus, as
early merchants were vested with rules of trade as ordained by customs
distinct from national law, international arbitrators are likewise in the
process of developing transnational standards for commerce. As Professor
David surmised:
We must not, in effect, succumb to illusions. Arbitration in
current international practice is neither arbitration 'properly
speaking' which is disposed to the application of a national law
nor amiable composition as it was conceived of at the beginning
by the canon law scholars. It is much more an aspiration toward
a new type of law.' 2
Professor David's assessment is buttressed by numerous arbitration
decisions, which have refused to rely on national law when facing
trassnational commercial issues. One such case submitted to arbitration
involved a dispute between a Turkish company and a French company
regarding the interpretation of an agency agreement.
3 
The parties had
failed to designate which law-French, Turkish, or other national
law-should govern the agreement. After noting relevant European
jurisprudence (the Hague Convention of 1978 on the Law Applicable to
Agency), the arbitrator could not adequately determine "where the parties
intended to localize [their] contract." Therefore, the arbitrator concluded:
'In the absence of any reference to a given law, the drafting of
the agreement in France . . . and its acceptance in Turkey ...
offer no indication capable of revealing a sufficiently clear
common intent. Faced with the difficulty of choosing a national
law, the application of which is sufficiently compelling, the
Tribunal considered that it was appropriate, given the international
nature of the agreement, to leave aside any compelling reference
to a specific legislation, be it Turkish or French, and to apply
international lex mercatoria.'"
62. Carbonreau, supra note 4, at 580-81 (citing R. DAveD, L'ARBrRAai DANs LE
COMMERE INTERNATtONAL 117 (1982)).
63. Pabalk Ticaret, supra note 61, at 110.
64. Id. The tribunal relied on the custorn of good faith dealings to determine whether the
[Vol. 12
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This decision was eventually affirmed by the Austrian Supreme Court,
which ruled that the arbitrator did not exceed their authority under the
arbitration agreement," The court did not directly comment on the
arbitrator's use of the law merchant; however, other arbitrations, especially
those implicating nation-states or state agencies, often have applied
international principles and the law merchant in resolving disputes."
E. Development of Transnational Legal Principles Within
International Commercial Arbitrations
Among the various arbitration awards that reflect the international
nature of commercial relationships are those involving the nationalization
of oil interests by the Libyan Arab Republic. 7 These awards represent
some of the more significant applications of anational principles to the
resolution of transnational commercial disputes.
The arbitral proceeding in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., California
Asiatic Oil Co." is emblematic of an anational adjudication. The dispute
arose out of the nationalization of oil interests by Libya in 1973 and
1974." Prior to nationalization, Libyan authorities and various interna-
tional oil companies had executed fourteen deeds of concession whereby
the oil companies were granted rights to extract oil from Libyan territo-
ry.
0 
Clause 16 of the standard deed provided:
The Libyan Government, the (Petroleum) Commission and the
competent authorities in the Provinces shall take all the steps that
are necessary to ensure that the Company enjoys all the rights
principal or agent breached the duty, which equity "required to be remedied." td. at I11.
65. Melis, supra note 61, at 160-63; see Note, The Lex Mercatoria in Paris and Vienna, 17
J. WoRLD TRADE 358 (1983).
66. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. The Governmrent of the Libyan Arab Republic,
Award of January 19, 1977, reprinted in 4 Y.B. CoM. Ann. 177, 185 (1979) (Int'l Council for
Com. Arb.) [hereinafter Texaco Overseas]; see also British Petroleum Ecploration Company
Ltd (Libya) v. Goverrnent of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 INT'L . REv. 297 (1979). In
British Petroleum the tribunal looked to "principles of international law" and "general principles
of law" where the contract excluded sole reference to national law. td. However, principles
of Libyan law were to be considered as long as they were not in contravention of international
principles. Id.
67. See supra note 66.
68. Texaco Overseas, supra note 66, at 177.
69. See generally id
70. hi at 177-78.
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conferred upon it by this concession, and the contractual rights
expressly provided for in this concession may not be infringed
except by agreement of both parties.
This concession shall be interpreted during the period of its
effectiveness in accordance with the provisions of the Petroleum
Law and the Regulation issued thereunder at the time of the grant
of the concession, and any amendments to or cancellations of
these Regulations shall not apply to the contractual rights of the
Company except with its consent.
7
In 1973, the fist of two Decrees of Nationalization were announced
with respect to the California Asiatic Oil Company and Texaco Overseas
Petroleum Company.72 The partial nationalization was completed in 1974
with the passage of Law No. 11 of 1974.
7
1 Pursuant to Libyan national
law and clause 28 of the Deeds of Concession, the companies gave notice
of their intent to arbitrate the matter.
74 
Since Libya refused to respond
to this request, the companies acted pursuant to clause 28 of the Conces-
sion and petitioned the president of the International Court of Justice for
the appointment of an arbitrator to hear the dispute.75 This request
resulted in the appointment of Renee-Jean Dupuy as arbitrator.76
The arbitration site was set at Geneva, Switzerland.' In March
1975, the arbitrator decided to bifurcate the arbitral proceedings.
8 
The
first phase of the arbitration addressed whether the arbitrator had jurisdic-
tion to hear the dispute.' If jurisdiction existed, the arbitrator would then
address the merits of the case. In reaching his decision on the jurisdiction-
al question, the arbitrator found that "international case law" and legal
71. lelat 178.
72. See id.
73. von Mehren & Kourides, International Arbitrations Between States and Foreign Private
Ponies: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476, 476 (1981).
74. Texaco Overseas, supra note 66, at 178.
75. Id
76. The Libyan government filed its only legal memorandum in the proceeding, asserting
that the case should not be submitted to arbitration. International Arbitral Tribunal: Award on
the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil
Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 8 (1978) [hereinafter
Int'l Arbitral Tribunal].
77. Id.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id.
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commentary supported his assertion of jurisdiction.0 He also cited to
clause 28 of the Deeds of Concession, which provided that "the sole
arbitrator, shall determine the applicability of this clause and the procedure
to be followed in the arbitration."8 '
From this language, the arbitrator inferred "that the parties had agreed
that [he] alone could determine whether he ha[d] jurisdiction." 2  The
jurisdictional question aside, the arbitrator proceeded to determine what law
would govern the merits of the arbitration. Specifically, he had to choose
whether to apply municipal law or international principles. After
considering the various factors involved in the dispute, the arbitrator chose
to follow international legal principles in reaching a decision.3
The arbitrator's selection of international law was based on various
factors. First, he noted that the parties had "intended to secure the
guarantee of a neutral judge," as evidenced by the fact that the arbitration
was to be conducted outside of Libya." Second, the question of
enforcing foreign law on a sovereign, and the fact that the arbitration
agreement provided that the parties could prevail upon the International
Court of Justice for relief, buttressed the position that the arbitration was
subject to international law.
85 
Third, clause 28 of the Deeds of Conces-
sion provided that the local rules of procedure should be excluded."e
These and other factors led the arbitrator to rule that the arbitration would
be governed by international legal principles.
With respect to the substantive issues in the case, the arbitrator ruled
80. Texaco Overseas, supra note 66, at 179 (citing Nottebohm (Leichtertein v. Gua), 1953
I.C.J. 111, 119 (Nov. 18, 1953)); see R. DAvI, L'ARrrRAa E Commtcts. INrERNATIONAL
EN DRorr CoMPARE, COURS DE DocroRAT 313 (1968-69).
81. Texaco Overseas, supra note 66, at 179.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id, at 180.
85. Id The arbitrator noted:
1]f, inthe Sapphire cas , the designation of the sole arbitrator by the President of
the Swiss Federal Tribunal (coupled with the fact that the seat of the arbitration had
been fixed at Lausanne) could be considered as implying that that arbitration should
be subject to the judicial sovereignty of Vaud, the fact that, in the present dispute,
the parties had agreed to have recourse, if need be, to the President of the
International Court of Justice implies that it was their intention that this arbitration
should come under the aegis of the United Nations and, therefore, that the system
of law governing this arbitration should be international law.
Int'l Arbitral Tribunal, supra note 76, at 8.
86. Id at 9.
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that the Deeds of Concession constituted a contract.
7 
This holding was
based on both decisional law involving international cases and scholarly
commentary." At one point the arbitrator noted:
mhe Deeds of Concession in dispute are not controlled by
Libyan law or, more exactly, are not controlled by Libyan law
alone. It is incontestable that these contracts were international
contracts, both in the economic sense because they involved the
interests of international trade and in the strict legal sense because
they included factors connecting them to different States, an
international contract having being recently defined as being 'that
contract whose [sic] elements are not all located in the same
territory. 8
9
The arbitrator also cited clause 28 of the Deeds of Concession, which
provided:
'This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accor-
dance with the principles of the law of Libya common to the
principles of international law and in the absence of such
common principles then by and in accordance with the general
principles of law, including such of those principles as may have
been applied by international tribunals."
The Deeds of Concession served to memorialize the relationship between
the two parties as one not governed strictly by Libyan (municipal) law.
The arbitrator commented, however, that failure to reference municipal law
did not leave the contract "without law."9 In such matters involving
"internationalized" contracts, "the agreement comes in fact under the ambit
of a law, a set of rules constituted by the lex mercatoria which derives
from the usages accumulated in the field covered by the contract recog-
nized under the general principles of national juridical systems and, to all
87. Id.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id. at II (citing Horsmans & Verwilghen, Stabilird et Evolution du Contrat Economique
International, in CaNras CHARLS DE VISSCuER POUR LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL, LE coNTRAT
ScoNOtnQus INERNATIONAL 464 (1975)).
90. id. at 11.
91. Id.
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nations."' 2
The arbitrator concluded that the Deeds of Concession could be
interpreted by arbitral decisions and international practices.93 In so ruling,
he cited three major developments of international arbitral awards, which
suggested that the contract had been internationalized: first, reference to
general principles of law in the arbitration agreement; second, submission
of a contract dispute to an arbitration tribunal; and third, the new class of
economic development contracts between nation-states and private persons.
This last point was particularly germane because economic development
contracts usually involved "stabilization clauses" that attempt to "remove
all or part of the agreement from the internal law and to provide for its
correlative submission to sui generis rules ... or to a system which is
properly an international law system.""
The arbitrator further stated that, based on both national and interna-
tional law, a nation-state had an absolute right to nationalize industries. A
country's unfettered right to nationalization, however, could not be viewed
as a mandate to avoid international obligations, especially where a
stabilization clause obligated the government to perform certain duties. He
then noted that
[c]lause 16 of the Deeds of Concession contains a stabilization
clause with respect to the rights of the concession holder. As
consideration for the economic risks to which the foreign
contracting parties were subjected, the Libyan State granted them
a concession of a minimum duration of 50 years, more specifical-
ly, containing a non-aggravation clause ... which provided:
'The Government of Libya will take all steps necessary to insure that
the company enjoys all the rights conferred by this concession. The
contractual rights expressly created by this concession shall not be
altered except by mutual consent of the parties."
The arbitrator concluded that "in respect of the international law of
contracts, a nationalization cannot prevail over an internationalized
contract, containing stabilization clauses, entered into between a State and
92. ld at 13.
93. Mann, England Rejects Decentralized Contracts andArbitration, 33 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
193, 196-98 (1984).
94. Int'l Arbitral Tribunal, supra note 76, at 17.
95. Id. at 24.
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a foreign private company."6 He arbitrator also cited to certain resolu-
tions of the United Nations regarding the subject of nationalization. The
resolutions obligated the arbitrator "to consider... the possible existence
of a custom.""
After referencing myriad sources, including Libyan law, international
decisional law,
98 
arbitral law," international practice,"
m 
and scholarly
commentary,' the arbitrator held that the principle of restitutio integrum
should be invoked against the Libyan government, thereby compelling
specific performance of its obligations under the Deeds of Concession.
The award rendered in the TOPCO/CALASL4TIC arbitration was
significant not only because it held that a State was subject to the remedy
of restitutio integrum, but also because it represents one of the most salient
applications of anational principles-international case law, arbitral awards,
legal commentary, and commercial practice-to establish universal
commercial precedents. Its impact on the modem law merchant is
significant.1
0 2
96. Id. at 25. The arbitrator added:
rl]he state granting the concession retains the permanent enjoyment of its sovereign
rights; it cannot be deprived of the right in any way whatsoever, the contract which
it entered into with a private company cannot be viewed as an alienation of such
sovereignty but as a limitation, partial and limited in time, of the exercise of
sovereignty.
ld at 26.
97. id. at28 (quoting G.A. Res. 3281, ch. 1, art. 2, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 23) at 302,
U.N. Doe. A/9623/Rev. 1 (1974)).
98. Id. at 32-33 (citing Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J., No. 17, at 47;
Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 65 (Feb. 5); Temple of Preah-Vthear
(Cambodia v. Thailand) 1962 I.CJ. 6 (June 15)).
99. Id. at 33 (citing Arbitral Award in the Martini Case, 25 Am. I. IrT'L . 554, 585
(1931)).
100. id. at 33 (citing Memorial of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. Pleadings
(Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.) 64, 124 July 22)).
101. Id. at 34-35 (citing H. LAUTEP, ACwr, PtVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANAt.OIES OF
INTERNATIoNAL LAw 149 (1927); L. REnTzER, LA REPARAIONt COMME CONSEQUENCE DE L'
Acre ILucrrE N DRorr INTERNATIONAL 173 (1938)).
102. The Award on the Merits is an important invaluable contribution to internation-
al law. It is a thoroughly researched and carefully reasoned decision c firming
basic principles of law. The Award makes serious inroads into new areas of
law and, for one of the first times, explores the role of contractual relationships
in a developing world economic order. Where case law in intenational
jurisprudence has been sparse and, at times, inconletsive, this decision will
prove to be a major contribution to international law.
von Mehren & Kourides, The Libyan Nationalizations: TopcolCalasiatic v Libyan Arbitration,
12 NAT'L RESOURCES L. 419,425 (1979). The same commentators add: "The thoroughness and
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F. Amiable Composition
Another practice that has prospered through international arbitration
is the utilization of amiable compositeurs. The doctrine of amiable
composition emanates from the civil law traditions. The practice empowers
the arbitrator to adjudicate a dispute based on the arbitrator's conscience
and principles of equity. This contrasts with traditional court adjudications,
which normally compel the application of the municipal law of a particular
nation-state.
Both major international arbitral institutions, the International Chamber
of Commerce and UNCITRAL provisions, have formally recognized the
use of amiable compositeurs in their governing rules. Article 13(4) of the
ICC Rules provides that the arbitrator "shall assume the powers of an
amiable compositeur if the parties are agreed to give him such powers."
Article 28 of the UNCITRAL states that the "arbitral tribunal shall decree
ex aequo et bono or amiable compositeur only if the parties have expressly
authorized it to do so."
While widely adopted by nations with civil law traditions, common
law jurisdictions have continued to view amiable composition with
suspicion. Opponents of amiable composition believe that the doctrine
would allow unbridled use of power to derogate the rights and obligations
of contracting parties on the basis of some undefinable notions of justice.
However, the labyrinth of arbitral and legal rules, as well as juristic
limitations, work to prevent misuse of the institution of amiable composi-
tion.
First, both ICC rules and UNCITRAL mandate that the arbitrator take
into consideration the terms of the contract and relevant trade usages.
0 3
Clearly, the amiable compositeur is proscribed from "rewriting an
agreement.
"
tte Second, in addition to complying with the rules of the
relevant arbitration institutions, the arbitrator cannot abuse the mandatory
public policy or order public of the lex fori.
°5 
Compliance with these
"mandatory rules of law" ensures the enforceability of the award under the
New York Convention.'ta Last, the amiable compositeur must honor
careful reasoning of the decision and the extensive legal authoeity suppoting it will establish
this decision as a model in the international judicial process and will confien its contribution
to the progressive development of international law." ld at 434.
103. See ICC Rule 13(5) and UNCITRAL art. 33.
104. W. CRAIG, W. PARx, & J. PAULSSON, supra note 1, pt. lIt, § 18.03, at 97.
105. Agreement relating to Application of the European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration [hereinafter European Convention]. in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARNIATrION 116 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1974) .
106. Jarvin, The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers, in CONTEMPORARY
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L.
basic rights, such as proffering evidence, calling witnesses, and other
procedural rights." As one group of commentators concluded:
Frequently, it is difficult to see how a decision which determines
the respective obligations of the parties differs in ordinary cases
as opposed to amiable composition cases. Perhaps the most
marked difference is in evaluating the consequences of non-per-
formance. The amiable compositeur is much more at ease in
establishing compensatory damages and awarding interest by the
application of standards of commercial fairness than an ordinary
arbitrator who must seek to justify his calculation by strict legal
rules. It is perhaps in this field, more than any other, that the
utilization of amiable composition powers may as a practical
matter affect the outcome of a case.t'
Delaume adds that "amiable composition must be regarded as an institution
which, while it imports a high degree of flexibility into the arbitral
procedure, also gives the parties the assurance that their basic rights will
be preserved."
tm
Amiable composition has been historically recognized within the civil
law. In international trade matters, French decisional law has gone so far
as to hold that when a contractual issue is decided on "general principles
PRoBLEMs IN INTERNATIONAL ARBmRAtoN 50, 71 (J. Low ed. 1986). Under American
jurisprudence, these "mandatory rlen" must ompnort with the public policy of the leafoi. Id.;
see infra text accompanying notes 280-95. As one commentator adds:
The basic assertion behind the reasoning is that a 'private agreement' which opts
for an amiable remedy can in no circumstance 'derogate from public policy, even
by instituting amiable composirears' The general practices am than:
'Rules concerning public policy (lois d'order public), which protect the general
interest in the political, economic and moral order and which apply notwithstanding
any provision to the contrary (for instance tax law, penal law and so on). Panies
car, never, at any moment validly derogate from the application of such rules.'
T. GEBRERANA, aarrRATION: AN ELEMENT o INTERNAToNAL LAW 49 (1984) (quoting
Sienont, Amiable Compositeara and Their Reasoning, in INTERNAToNAL CoMMEcIAL
AnmrIow, supra note 105, at 137). It is also axiomatic that the amiable compositeur cannot
vitiate the general rules of the arbitration institutions. See European Convention, in
INTERNATIONAL CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 105, at 117; G. DELAuME, LAW ANt
PRACIcE OF TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 344 (1988).
107. European Convention, in INTERNATONAL CoMMERcnAL AttrTAnoON, supra note 105,
at 118.
108. W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, supra note 1, pt. i1, § 18.03, at 97.
109. G. DEI.AUsE, s pra note 106, at 324.
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of the law of obligations," arbitrators do not act as amiable compositeurs
but rather "remain within the boundaries of law." ° The arbitrators'
major limitation is that they cannot exercise their equitable powers as
amiable compositeurs unless so empowered by the parties. This position
contrasts with English common law, which has historically frowned upon
amiable composition and the assertion that legal rights can be determined
without reference to a system of law.' Nevertheless, English arbitrators
have possessed powers similar to those of amiable compositeurs -even
prior to the 1979 Arbitration Act.
If... the two principal characteristics of amiable composition are
the predominance of equity over law and restriction on the right
of appeal, these features are known at common law albeit arrived
at by other means without specific claims that the arbitration is
not being conducted under law , . . [Flor instance, prior to the
most recent amendments of the arbitration law, arbitrators
frequently refused officially to give any reasons for the award.
This kept courts from striking down an award for error of law on
its face; the reasoning of the arbitrators in reaching their award
was thus shielded from review."
2
Although the United States has not formally adopted the use of amiable
composition, arbitration practice suggests that "an amiable compositeur is
not unusual in American arbitration.""
3
Despite the misconceptions surrounding amiable composition, its
acceptance is growing. Even jurisdictions that do not overtly countenance
the practice have upheld arbitral awards rendered by arbitrators acting as
amiable compositeurs."' Use of amiable compositeurs is becoming





and, to a lesser
110. Id. at 321-22.
111. M. MuSTLL & S. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERcIAL sRrrsATION IN
ENGLAND 611-17 (1982). See generally Mann, supra note 93.
112. W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULissON, supra note 1, pt. m11, §18.01, at 94.
113. R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT YOU NEED To KNOW 28-29 (1980); AM.
AR. A., COMMERCIAL sBIreAroN RULES 30 (annotated Feb. 1, 1984); Stein & Wotman,
supra note 7, at 1714 (citing Holtznas, United States of America: The American Arbitration
Association, in HANDBOOK OF INSTITrIoNAL ARBITRATION I  INTERNATIONAL TRAWE: FACTS,
FIGrE AND RULES, 258-59 (E. Cohn, M. Domke, & F. Eisemans eds. 1977)).
114. Paulsson, The Role ofSwedish Courts in TransnationalCommercialArbitration, 21 VA.
J. INT'L . 211, 228-29 (1981).
115. W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSsON, supra note 1, pt. 111, § 18.02, at 96.
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degree, disputes involving developing nations."'
The awards of amiable compositeurs also promote a more reasoned
approach and expansion of the international law merchant. To illustrate,
under the ICC rules, the amiable compositeur "is not relieved" from its
responsibility to state reasons for its award."8 Such a requirement will
allow the law merchant to evolve systematically, similar to the develop-
ment of common law. Finally, amiable composition within international
arbitration provides a more neutral forum for resolving international
commercial disputes. Despite the concern voiced with respect to the
powers of amiable compositeurs,
[a]uthorizing the tribunal to apply the customary rules of equity
and international commerce may, however, achieve an important
goal of international commercial arbitration-an alternative
dispute resolution system that is truly international and neutral,
not limited by rigid parochial interests as reflected in a nation's
rules of law."
9
The significance of the law merchant and the emphasis on unifying
commercial law has also been observed in proceedings emanating from the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. This Tribunal was established to
resolve various claims between citizens and corporations from Iran and the
United States. These disputes were not to be based upon the law of any
single country. With this format, the Tribunal constituted "one of the
most ambitious and complex international claims adjudication programs
ever undertaken."'
20
The international nature of the Tribunal was best evidenced by an
award involving a contractual claim that was to be governed by the laws
of the State of Idaho.' Despite the express choice of Idaho law in the
116. Jakubowski, Arbitration in the CMEA, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CoMMERcIAL ARBITRA-
TION, supra note 105, at 75, 81-82.
117. See, e.g., Goldman, Arbitration and Transfer of Technology in Latin America, in
ARBITRATION AND THE LIcENsING PRoCEsS 5-29 (R. Goldscheider & M. do Hass eds. 1984).
See generally W. CRAio, W. PARK, & J. PAuLSSON, supra note 1, pt. VI, § 36, at 655-57 (2d
ed. 1990).
118. Jarvin, supra note 106, at 72.
119. Stein & Wotnan, supra note 7, at 1714.
120, Stewart & Sherman, Developments at the lran-United States Claims Tribunal:
1981-1983,24 VA J. INT'L . 1, 6 (1983). See generally Swanson, Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal: A Policy Analysis of the Expropriation Cases, 18 CASE W. RES. 1. INT'L L. 307
(1986).
121. Award No. 245, (99-245-2) 27 December 1983, 10 Y.B. Com. Arb. 316.
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contract, the Tribunal did not feel "rigidly tied to the law of the contract."
Instead, the Tribunal relied on the general grant in the claimants'
Settlement Declaration (art. V), which stated:
'The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for
law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of
commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines to
be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade,
contract provisions and changed circumstances."'
The Declaration did establish certain artificial boundaries not presently
accorded to national courts with regard to the scope of the choice of law.
However, the Tribunal's disregard of an express choice-of-law provision
is significant. In rejecting the choice of law, the Tribunal was guided
more by concerns of "justice and equity" than by concern for applying
national laws which furthered other "legitimate goals."' This may
partially explain why the Tribunal was empowered to take into account
"relevant usages of the trade" in addition to the express provisions of the
contract. Thus, in resolving the international dispute, the Tribunal turned
to "general principles of law"-rather than the law expressly chosen-be-
cause, inter alia, the claims were of a "commercial nature.,
24
It is certain that national courts do not enjoy as broad a choice of law
mandate as did the Iran-United States Tribunal. Despite this jurisdictional
limitation, the Tribunal's decision to apply transnational principles instead
of national rules demonstrates an underlying tenet that a growing body of
international principles is available to resolve claims of a "commercial
nature,"
t
" which arise out of international contracts.
III. THE LAW MERCHANT, NATIONAL LAW, AND
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND
The evolution of the law merchant and the attendant use of business
customs to decide mercantile disputes is central to the history of English
commercial law. Until the middle of the fifteenth century, England
122. Id. at 318.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 318-19.
125. The Tribunal's decision also addressed one of the key reasons for analyzing
supranational principles by noting that national laws contain the legitimate goals of na-
tion-states. Such principles are not necessarily supportive of international merchants, trade, and
other international concerns for fairly regulating conuerce in a neutral, uniform aner. See
generally id
N.Y.L. SCl. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
assisted in the development of the law merchant in deciding commercial
disputes, as noted by its role in establishing the Court of Oleron and the
various fair courts conducted throughout the nation. Government
encouragement of these informal forums, however, was short-lived. The
Statute of 1477, which narrowed the jurisdiction of the fair courts to
disputes occurring on the fair grounds, marked the beginning of the end of
the medieval law merchant and the start of a new era-the incorporation
of the law merchant into the common law.
The limitation placed on the fair courts in 1477 was symptomatic of
other commercial and sociological forces that led to the demise of the law
merchant in England. Whereas merchants from the Continent dominated
commercial activity in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, England's
mercantile class had "grown up" by the middle of the sixteenth centu-
ry
. 2
' English companies began to develop and carry on extensive trade.
Traders became more affixed to a certain location and utilized shipping as
a means to market goods.
2 7 
As the nomadic medieval merchants and
the use of fair courts and similar institutions became outdated, the growing
sophistication of the English merchant class ushered in a new era of trade.
As the conduct of trade changed in the late 1OOs, so too did the
significance of the English pie-powder, staple, and other borough courts.
An increasing number of commercial disputes found their way into the
English Admiralty Court. The traders preferred this tribunal over other
common law courts because the Admiralty Court continued to apply law
merchant principles in rendering decisions.s The Admiralty Court
provided an alternative to merchants because it had traditionally applied
civil law doctrines to disputes and regularly heard cases involving foreign
parties.
1
" Moreover, even by the mid-seventeenth century, common law
126. Jones, supra note 30, at 450-51.
127. Id. at 451. See generally T. PLUCKNrTr, supra note 40.
128. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 128-39.
129. H. PorrEi, AN HITroRIcAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIoNs
194-95 (1932). Reliance on the Admiralty Court was enhanced by various considerations,
including:
(i) Foreigners only understood the civil law;
(ii) If contracts were drawn abroad there were only civilians available for the
purpose;
(iii) Civil law was the Jus Gentium;
(iv) Civil law was closer to the Law Merchant than was the common law;
(v) Process of the civil law was mare effective where a party was absent and
especially in the matter of reception of evidence; and
(vi) The Common Law Judges forming a part of the High Court of Delegates could
prevent injustice.
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courts struggled with understanding the concepts envisioned in the law
merchant and the issues raised in commercial cases."s
Application of the law merchant resulted in a more liberal use of
negotiable instruments, including delivery and payment terns that varied
from domestic practice, and other civil law concepts previously unknown
to common law judges. Nevertheless, the Admiralty Court's claim over
commercial disputes did not endure the onslaught of forces intent on
placing commercial disputes within the realm of the common law courts.
This end was brought about by both political and judicial infighting.
Politically, the Tudor monarchy did not involve itself in settling
jurisdictional disputes among the various courts in the 1600s.t
3 ' There-
fore, more authority inured to the judiciary in establishing competing
claims of jurisdiction. The rise to prominence by one justice in particular,
Sir Edward Coke, ensured the demise of the law merchant's separate
identity. Coke laid the groundwork for common law adherents to wrest
jurisdiction of commercial matters from Admiralty Courts following the
Great Rebellion.'
It is clear that the Court of Admiralty had on its side not only
historical truth, but also substantial convenience .... It is clear,
too, that the opposition of Coke and the common lawyers was
unscrupulous. But the common law had, after the Great Rebel-
lion, gained the upper hand. And, from the point of view of the
conunon law, the attack had been skillfully directed upon a
position which it was worth much to secure; for the prize was
nothing less than the commercial jurisdiction of a country the
commerce of which was then rapidly expanding. Its commerce
was in the future destined to expand beyond the most sanguine
dreams of the seventeenth century. Coke could not foresee this.
Id.; see 5 W. HOLnswoRn , supra note 13, at 138.
130. Before the House of Lords in 1660, Jenkins protested that
All merchants abroad make their contracts according to the marine or civil law, the
differences therefore upon those contracts, should not be judged by a law that hath
nothing in it, either provisional or decisive in such casea. And pardon me, my
Lords, if I say the judges of the common law cannot so easily and naturally take
notice of the marine law. There are so many terms and clauses . . . in every
contract, that it is very hard to make an English jro understand them; not to speak
of the differences there are among the civil writers themselves about the true
meaning of them.
5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 138 n.5.
131. Id. at 153.
132. lid. at 558.
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But he worshipped the common law; and he rendered it by no
means the least of his many valuable services when he directed,
and sometimes misdirected, his stores of technical learning to
secure for it this new field. To the litigant his action meant much




Various common law courts, including the Council and Star Chamber,
had an impact on the transformation of English commercial law in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Council, in its supervisory role
over the various English courts, established certain court procedures to be
implemented in commercial cases, including those in admiralty.
i 
The
Star Chamber, an offshoot of the Council, also heard commercial suits in
cases concerning foreign parties and suits among corporate entities.
3 5
By the seventeenth century, a majority of commercial cases shifted to
the King's Bench, Court of Common Pleas, Court of Chancery, and Court
of Requests. As a result, judges who had little expertise in transnational
commercial matters were entrusted with developing and incorporating the
law merchant into the common law via "the machinery and .. , technical
atmosphere of the courts of law and equity."" With this development,
the last remnant of commercial suits came within the jurisdiction of the
common law courts.' Eventually, the judicial incorporation of the law
merchant into the common law led to the passage of numerous national
statutes involving commercial matters.'
38
The loss of the admiralty and fair courts did not sit well with
merchants. Merchants had always distrusted the protracted procedures of
the common law courts, and, as greater incorporation took place, merchants
looked to alternative forums to settle their disputes. Two of the early
133. Id.
134. Id. at 504. The Council generally interposed its authority in matters involving "the
safety of the State." Id.
135. See generally 5 i. at 137. The evolution of both the council and Star Chamber are
discussed in l id. at 477-516.
136 5 id. at 153.
137. Note, supra note 4, at 214; see Goodwin v. Robarts, t0 L.R.-Ex. 337, 346 (1875)
(Cockhurn, C.J.), where the court stated that "[bly this process, what before was usage only,
unsanctioned by legal decision, has become engrafted upon, or incorporated into, the common
law, and may thus be said to farm pan of it."
138. See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act, 1894, 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71; Bills of Exchange Act, 1882,
45 & 46 Vict., oh. 61; Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 17; see also 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 569; Berman & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 227 n.15.
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alternative tribunals were established under the Bankruptcy Act of
157 1'" and the Insurance Act of 16 0 10"s The Insurance Act called for
the selection of a special commission to include merchants, as well as
solicitors from both common and civil law backgrounds.'
4' Unfortunate-
ly, the insurance tribunal did not meet with overwhelming success, partly
due to the interference of the law courts, which held concurrent jurisdiction
with the insurance commission.
4 2
The formation of English trading companies resulted in the develop-
ment of another informal dispute resolution method. As English commerce
expanded beyond the United Kingdom and Europe, the monopolistic
trading companies established an intracompany dispute resolution system.
By this procedure, the various affiliated entities within the chartered
companies used their own tribunals to resolve controversies.'
43 
The
intracompany dispute scheme, the bankruptcy and insurance tribunals, and
the use of arbitration represented alternatives to common law court
adjudication. These alternative tribunals were significant to English
merchants, who, unlike their European counterparts, had yet to possess a
separate commercial court to adjudicate their disputes. For merchants, the
expansion of the common law courts' jurisdiction over commercial matters
had various negative effects. Common law judges were perceived as
ill-equipped to resolve issues involving trade. The Chancery Court and
common law courts aggravated the problem by submitting overly technical
and novel commercial questions to juries.
'
" Although common law
courts took judicial notice of commercial custom,
45 only merchants
could plead custom in the early part of the seventeenth century.'" This
139. Bankruptcy Act, 1571, 13 Eliz., ch. 7.
140. Insurance Act, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 12, as amended 1862, 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 23.
141. 43 Eliz., ch. 12, § 5.
142. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 571. Other "extensive projects of legislative
reform," similar to the Insurance and Bankruptcy Tribunals, were proposed due to the lack of
expertise in certain specialized areas. See 5 id. at 150-51; Note, supra note 4, at 215.
143. 5 W. Howswosm, supra note 13, at 14951 (1927); see G. KEETON, ENGLISH LAW
183 (1974). See generally, Schmitthoff, lie Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO
L.J 74 (1939-40). Similarly, the Liverpool Cotton Exchange, London Cons Trade Association,
and other organizations established their own arbitration procedures. Jones, supra note 30, at
462.
144. A. KiALFY, supra note 32, at 123; T. PLucKNErr, supra note 40, at 660.
145. 5 W. HoDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 145. "[T]he courts, at the beginning of the
seventeenth century, found it much move convenient to allow the customs of merchants to be
pleaded specially. .. . In the fast place... lawyers were very ignorant as to the exact scope
of many of these customs." Id.
146. Bamaby v. Rigalt, 79 Eng. Rep. 864 (Cr. Car. 1633).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
situation changed by 1666, with the declaration that "the law of merchants
[was] the law of the land, and the custom [was] good enough generally for
any man without naming him merchant."'
47
Although a party could argue custom, the standard of proof required
by courts largely eviscerated this cornerstone of the law merchant. Proof
of a custom required a showing that the custom had existed since time
immemorial within a specified locality.
48 Similarly, customs could only
be established where they were viewed as "reasonable, certain and not
arbitrary."
4 9 Although customs could cover terms not specifically
addressed by the parties, it was ruled at a later date that new customs could
not vacillate from established rules of law.'"
° As Smith concluded, the
standards exacted by "the King's court .. .did much to put an end to
[the] diversity of usages."
15 i
The predisposition of Lord Coke, the general perseverance of common
law advocates, and the competition between the various courts accelerated
the incorporation of the law merchant into the common law. By the
eighteenth century, the law merchant had become just another component
of the English common law, having lost the separate, divisible nature that
it had possessed during the medieval era. Moreover, the common law
courts inhibited the flexible nature of the use of customs.
The plight of the merchant class was not totally ignored, due in main
part to Lord Mansfield's attention and guidance. Mansfield became Chief
Justice of England in 1754. He brought to the position a knowledge of
147. Woodward v. Rowe, 84 Eng. Rep. 84 (Keb. 1666). Despite the early formalism of
English courts, custom could be proved by stating: (1) the factual b ckground of the case; (2)
the custom at issue; and (3) the duties resulting from the custom. 1. HOLDEN, THE HiSTORY
OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMsNTrs N ENGLISH LAW 31 (1955); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13,
at 160; see Oaste v. Taylor, 79 Eng. Rep. 262 (Cro. Jac. 1613); Woodward v. Rowe, 84 Eng.
Rep. 84 (Keb. 1666).
At a later date, custom did not need to be specificaay pled since "mercaotile customs
[were] part of the common law." 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra nore 13, at 161; Williams v.
Williams, 90 Eng. Rep. 759 (W. & M. 1694). However, some more recent decisions have
retained stricter standards for proving the existence of custom. See Coo-Stan Industries of
Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd., 60 A.L.R. 294 (1986).
148. Tanistry Case, 80 Eng. Rep. 516,519-20 (Day. Ir. 1608); Legh v. Hewit, 102 Eng. Rep.
789, 790 (East. 1803); Lockwood v. Wood, 115 Eng. Rep. 19, 24 (Q.B. 1844); . HOLDEN,
supra note 147, 32. This requirement was eventually relaxed in Goodwin v. Robarts, 10 L.R.-
Ex. 337 (1875); Edelstein v. Schuler & Co., [1902] 2 K.B. 144; H. POTrER, supra note 129,
at 124 (2d ed. 1943).
149. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 146 n.3.
150. Compare Hutton v. Warren, 150 Eng. Rep. 517 (M. & W. 1836) with Goodwin v.
Roberts, 10 L.R.-Ex. 337 (1875) (per Cockburn, C.J.).
151. K. SMITH & D, KEENAN, ENGLIsH LAw 10 (7th ed. 1982).
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civil law doctrines that his predecessors had not possessed. He balanced
his duty to the common law against his knowledge and admiration of civil
and international legal norms, especially with regard to issues involving
commerce. His expertise led one peer to hail him as "the founder of
commercial law" in England.'
52  
Not only did Mansfield have an
academic and professional interest in comparative law, but he also
frequently discussed business customs with the merchants of the day.'
53
By the time Mansfield ascended to the bench as Lord Chief Justice,
the incorporation of the law merchant was nearly two centuries old.
Viewed in this light, his statement in Pillans v. Van Mierop,
14 
that "the
law of merchants and the law of the land is the same," was not too
startling a revelation. The end result was that customs and usages, in lieu
of being proven by the parties, were to be reviewed by courts as matters
of law."'a
Mansfield was cognizant of both the commercial law of an expanding
English empire and the needs of the merchant class. Due to the concerns
of the merchant class, Mansfield implemented a special type of jury
consisting of merchants who not only decided cases sub judice, but also
provided "special verdicts," which discussed commercial practices and
usages. This procedure assisted in the propagation of a more flexible and
dynamic mercantile law within the strictures of the common law.
5 6
152. Lickerbarrow v. Mason, 100 Eng. Rep. 35,40 (T.R. 1787); G. KEETON, supra note 143,
at 193.
153. G. KEETON, supra note 143, at 192-93. Campbell added:
Lord Mansfield will be held in reverence by the good and the wise, by the honest
merchants, the enlightened lawyer, the just statesman, and the conscientious judge.
The maxims of maritime jurisprudence, which he engrafted into the stock of the
common law, are not the exclusive property of a single age or nation, but the
common property of all times and all countries. They are built upon the most
comprehensive principles and the most enlightened experience of mankind. He
designed them to be of universal application, considering, as he himself has
declared, the maritime law to be not the law of a particular country but the general
law of nations.... He was ambitious of this noble thing, and studied deeply and
diligently and honestly to acquire it. He surveyed the commercial law of the
Continent, drawing from thence what was most just, useful, and rational; and let to
the world, as the fruit of his researches, a collection of general principles,
unexampled in extent and unequaled in excellence.
2 J. CAmBELL, Tu Urns OF THE CIEF JUSTIcEs OF ENGLAND 441 (1851).
154. Pillans v. Van Mierp, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1038 (Burr. 1765).
155. d
156. Mansfield also reviewed various sources within the law merchant, such as the
judgments of Oleron and civil law, when making decisions involving international commerce.
See Luke v. Lyde, 97 Eng. Rep. 614 (Bunr. 1759); Carbonnean & Firestone, supra note 38, at
62 n.37.
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Despite the potential for merchant juries to weave changing commercial
customs into the fabric of the common law, they were rarely used in
adjudications and were eventually abolished in the early nineteenth
century.
157
Absent the incorporation of the law merchant into the English common
law, English jurisprudence could not have adequately regulated its
burgeoning mercantile class. The concepts found in the law merchant
added a "cosmopolitan dimension" to England's commercial law.
50 
Its
impact was felt in various areas of English law, including issues involving
bills of exchange, negotiable instruments, maritime disputes, and con-
tracts.
159
It has been noted that the common law courts went about the task of
incorporating the law merchant. This resulted from Parliament's reluctance
to enter into the field of private commercial law."
0 
Eventually, Parlia-
ment began to borrow from the courts and the law merchant to enact
various commercial statutes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
157. See supra note 156. As Fifoot reflected:
The collaboration of judge and merchant, if it was to exercise its due influence upon
the law, required adequate channels of communiation. In the development of the
special jury, Lord Mansfield found the vital medium. It was no stranger to
commercial causes ... [blut its use long remained spasmodic and without system.
C. PtsooT, Loan MAsFSitD 104 (1936).
158. Berman & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 226, 276; L. TRACKMAN, supra note 23, at 27.
Even as late as 1803, hostility toward merchants was evident:
Merchants ought to take their law from the courts, and not the wmts from
merchants; and when the law is found inconvenient for the purposes of extended
commerce, application ought to be made to parliament for redress. Merchants ought
to be considered in no higher degree than their own legislatots or judges upon
subjects of commerce than farmers or sportsmen in questions upon leases or the
game laws. For the position of Lord Coke ought never to be forgotten:
'that the common law has no controller in soy part of it, but the high
ort of parliament; and if it not abrogated or altered by parliament, it
remains still ....'
READINGs ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAw 223 (It. Pound & T. Pluckmett
3d ed. 1927).
By comparing local practices regarding farming, leasing, and sports to the practices of
intemational merchants, these r marks misapprehend the dynamics of international commerce.
Them can be no true comparison because the practices to which international merchants arc
subject transcend national borders and involve numerous cultures, unlike relatively homoge-
neous local practices.
159. Ogg v. Shuter, 10 L.R-C.P. 159, 161 (1875); Gorgier v. Mieville, 107 Eng. Rep. 651
(B & C 1824); Livie v. Jasen, 104 Eng. Rep. 253 (East. 1820). "Once a custom had been
recognized, it generated its own body of case-law." G. KEETON, supra note 143, at 181; see
J. HOLDEN, supra note 147, at 14; 13 W. HoI.swosTH, supra note 13, at 382.
160. G. KEETON, sMpra note 143, at 174.
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These enactments reflected a deeper comprehension of international
trade.' In the early nineteenth century, bankers, merchants, and others
involved in commerce realized that unless existing laws were revised,
"capital would be withdrawn from trade"-not an enviable position for an
expanding empire deeply entrenched in international commerce."
A. The Commercial Court and Commercial List
By the nineteenth century, the law merchant had been absorbed into
the common law; however, the demands of the mercantile class for a
speedy, economical, and less judicious forum for dispute resolution
remained. Recognizing the need for an alternate forum, judges of the
Queen's Bench Division passed a resolution which laid the foundation for
the Commercial Court of England.
63
To be heard by the commercial court, parties placed their cases on the
commercial list. Matters placed on the list benefitted in at least two
important ways. First, disputes were adjudicated by jurists with expertise
in commerce, and second, procedural and discovery rules were relaxed.
Both factors enhanced speedier resolutions to commercial disputes.'"
The procedures of the Commercial Court were prescribed by statute in
1970,65 although adjudications of cases placed on the Commercial List
161. In the IM00, legislative committees were formed to study the commercial laws of
England. In 1823, the House of Commons Committee took note of the disparities between
English and European law and urged "an 'immediate alteration of the law for the protection
of commerce.'" 13 W. HOLDSWORTti, supra note 13, at 381 (quoting 4 PARL. PAPRS 268
(1823)); see Factors Act, 1823, 4 Geo. 4, ch. 83, amended as, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 94 (1825).
Some of the mom notable commercial enactments include: Bill of Exchange Act, 1882,
45 & 46 Vict. 366, ch. 61; Public General Statutes, 1855, 18 & 19 Vit. 95, eh. 13; Sale of
Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Viet. 6, ch. 71. Numerous principles governing banking, agency,
and other mercantile laws felt the presence of the law merchant. See G. KEETON, supra note
143, at 178-87; J. HOLDEN, supra note 147, at 15-19. It was also noted that various matters
involving negotiable instruments, admiralty, and insurance were affected by the law merchant
and civilian doctrines. 5 W. HOLDSWORT[, supra note 13, at 129-54.
162. 13 W. HoLDswOrTH, supra note 13, at 381 (citing 4 PARL. PAPERS 272).
163. Cf Parliament's inability to establish a similar Commercial Court os discussed in Kerr,
Modem Trends In Commercial Law and Practice, 41 MOs. L. REv. 1, 3 (1978). As noted by
the Honorable Michael Ken:
The judges of the Queen's Bench recognised that the speedy and efficient resolution
of commercial disputes was not only of importance to our administration of justice,
and indeed to ou national interest, but also that it was a matter for specialist
judges.
Id. at 2-3.
164. Id.; see Scrutton, The Work of the Commercial Courts, I CAMTcRtDG L.J. 6 (1921).
165. R.S.C. Ord. 72, r. 1; Administration of Justice Act, 1970, ch. 31.
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had been documented since the late nineteenth century.'
6 
The court's




Having a case placed on the Commercial List was advantageous to
merchants for several reasons. First, the puisne judges who presided in the
Commercial Court were normally experienced in commercial matters.
Second, formal rules of evidence were rarely applied and pleading
requirements were less rigidly enforced.'" Third, the efficiency of the
Commercial Court was enhanced due to the jurisdictional and procedural
authority of the judge. To illustrate, the judge assigned to hear the case
controlled its development from the outset of the litigation.' Moreover,
commercial court judges decided interlocutory questions instead of
referring such questions to special masters. This has enhanced the
efficiency of the Commercial Court in at least two ways:
First, the judge has control of the cases from an early stage. He
can discourage prolixity in pleadings and unnecessary requests for
particulars and discovery. He can use his experience and
influence to compel the parties to concentrate on the real issues,
often by ordering the trial of preliminary issues of hiving off
quantum from liability. He himself fixes the dates for trials and
summonses according to their estimated length, giving priority to
cases which are urgent. The second important consequence is
that commercial cases leap-frog the first stage of ordinary
interlocutory applications in the Queen's Bench Division. These
are heard initially by a Master, and then by a judge only on
appeal. The pressure is not only such that the telescoping of the
two stages may save weeks, often months ....
166. Barry v. Peruvian Corp., Ltd., [1896] I Q. 208.
167. id. at 209. The 1970 legislation provides jurisdiction over:
Any cause arising out of the ordinary transaction of merchants and traders and,
without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing words, any cause relating to the
construction of a mercantile document, the export of merchandise, affreightment,
insurance, banking, mercantile agency and mercantile usage.
R.5.C. Ord. 72, r. 1; Kerr, supra note 163, at 3.
168. Baerlien & Co. v. Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London & China, 72 L.T.R. 850
(1895); [1986] 1 Q.B. at 208; see The Applicability ofthe Procedure oftthe Commercial Court
to Common Law Actions Generally, 46 SoLic. J., July 19, 1902, at 644 [hereinafter Procedure
of the Commercial Court]; R.S.C. Ord. 72, r. 7(l), (3).
169. Procedure of the Commercial Court, supra note 168, at 644; [1986 1 Q.B. at 208.
170. Kenr, supra note 163, at 3. As one report noted:
The fact is that the judge, having seisin of the whole case from the first, knows
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One last feature of the Commercial Court involved the area of
commercial arbitration. Pursuant to section 4(1) of the Administration of
Justice Act of 1970, a judge assigned to the Commercial List may sit as
arbitrator over a commercial case assigned to the list.)71  The only
significant limitations being the "availability" of the judge, 72 and that the
dispute be of a "commercial character." 1" Pursuant to the Administra-
tion of Justice Act of 1970, any arbitrations held before a judge of the
Commercial Court could bypass the High Court and go directly to the
Court of Appeals'
74
B. Beyond the Commercial List: Statutory Attempts to
Promote Commercial Relations
Some modem statutes also have attempted to assimilate business
acumen within legislative enactments. For example, the Sale of Goods Act
implies certain conditions into commercial contracts, such as merchantabili-
ty and fitness of purpose.
75  
More importantly, section 55 of the Act
provides that certain sales contracts can be varied by customs, depending
on the circumstances. 176  This statutory exception demonstrates an
awareness that commercial customs and usages may differ from the usual
implied conditions or warranties.
The exception memorialized in section 55 has played a special role in
certain international sales contracts. For example, where parties enter into
cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) contracts, the buyer commonly pays for
goods upon delivery of the relevant papers instead of actual delivery. This
procedure differs from the "concurrent conditions" of delivery and payment
what are the really crucial points in the case and what evidence is required to
decide them. He can, therefore, put pressure on the parties to make admissions or
to narrow down their ease to cerain issues. He can tell whether that expensive
luxty, a commission to examine witneses, is really necessary, and in order to
secare his ends he can and does put in force the powers he possesses to mulct in
costs panies who unreasonably insist on proof of facts which are not really material
to the issue, or which for some other reason ought to have been admitted
Procedure of the Commercial Court, sapra note 168, at 645.
171. Kerr, supra note 163, at 3.
172. Administration of Justice A t, 1970, ch. 32, § 4(2).
173. fd at § 4(1); Kerr, supra note 163, at 5.
174. Administration of Justice Act, 1970, ch. 31, §4(4).
175. Sale of Goods Act, 1979, ch. 54, §§ 12-15; Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act,
1973, ch. 13, §§ 8-11; see K. SMTH & D. KEENAN, supra note 151, at 232-34.
176. Sale of Goods Act, 1979, ch. 54, § 55.
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outlined in section 28 of the Act." In allowing exceptions based on
trade usage, English courts have express (or at least implied) authority to
review principles established by business customs in order to facilitate the
adjudications based upon commercial agreements.
English courts also rely upon custom or trade usage, to a limited
degree, when their decisions are based on statutes that have incorporated
the medieval law merchant and other maritime laws. Case law also
suggests that even prior to the present Goods Act, law merchant principles
were utilized to reach decisions. Most of these decisions, however,
concerned issues involving negotiable instruments and admiralty matters,
particularly maritime contracts.'
78
Despite some application of custom or usage, it appears that English
courts fail to apprehend fully the extent of modem law merchant principles
that could provide assistance in traditional court adjudications. For
example, in The Julia,"' the court grappled with the issue of whether a
delivery order constituted a c.i.f. contract. In refusing to hold that a
delivery order was a c.i.f. contract, the House of Lords ultimately refused
to recognize established business custom. Instead, the court relied on
national law in holding that the contract did not pass title to the goods.
m
0
This holding conflicted with the law merchant and with the practices under
the London Corn Trade Association, both of which had upheld the concept
for years. As Berman contends:
The decision in The Julia is disturbing, then, both because the
court clung to older meanings of trade terms despite changes in
mercantile understandings, and also because it failed to confront
and accept foreign trade usages that differed from those with
which it was familiar.'
8
'
177. Contracts regularly fitting within the § 55 exception ace c.i.f. contracts, Ginzberg v.
Barrow Haenatite Steel Co., Ltd., [1966] 1 Q.B. 343, 348 and "fiee on board" (f.o.b.) contracts.
Wimble, Sons & Co. v. Rosenberg & Sons, [1913] 3 K.B. 743, 757. The 1979 Act codifies
older case law that recognized that commercial rights and obligations could be varied by
contmercial usage. See, e.g., Landauer & Co. v. Craven & Speeding Bros., [1912] 2 K.B. 94,
106. Section 55 of the Act is subject to the Unfair Contract Tetrs Act 1977, eh. 50, §§
6(1)(a)-(3) & 3(2). However, even this limitation is narrowed in the international context by
sections 26 and 27. See also 41 HALSBoR's LAWS oe ENOLAND 562-63 (4th ed. 1975).
178. See generally 12 HALsttRy's LAws OF ENGLAND, supro note 177, at 29-31.
179. Comptoir D'Achat et de Vente du Boerenbond Beige S.A. v. Luis De Ridder, Ltd.,
(The Julia), [1949] 1 All E.R. 269.
180. id.
181. Berman & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 260.
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The reluctance to transcend domestic law in another contract case was also
voiced in a decision by the Privy Council involving an analysis of the
proper law doctrine. The decision, Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v.
Kuwait Insurance Co.,"
82 
is instructive in that it also evidences England's
hostility toward applying the law merchant to international commercial
contracts.
The Amin Rasheed action involved a dispute between a Liberian
shipping company and a Kuwaiti insurance company." The plaintiff
had its principal place of business and chief office in Dubait The
plaintiff's sole contact with England was through an associated company
from which the plaintiff obtained insurance for its shipping operations.2 5
The defendant also had its principle office in Dubai and maintained other
offices in the Gulf.tM The defendant had neither an office nor a repre-
sentative in England.
87 
The action centered around a marine insurance
policy that the defendant had issued to the plaintiff) 8 The policy, which
had been issued in Kuwait, incorporated Lloyd's of London policy
language and was printed in English.'"
Lord Diplock began his decision in Amin Rasheed by establishing the
.proper law" of the contract, namely, "the law that governs the interpreta-
tion and validity of the contract and the mode of performance and the





proper law analysis, the House of Lords clearly rejected the position that
courts of law (or any quasi-judicial entity) could resolve private contractual
disputes without reference to a national system of law. As Lord Diplock
stated:
The reason for [identifying a particular system of law] is plain;
the purpose of entering into a contract being to create legal rights
and obligations between the parties to it, interpretation of the
contract involves determining what are the legal rights and







189. Id. at 243-44. The policy dated back to the 1906 Marine Insurance Act.
190. Id. at 245; Corapagnie D'Armnernent Maritime S.A. v. Compagnie Tunisienna De
Navigation S.A., [1971] A.C. 572, 603.
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obligations to which the words used in it give rise. This is not
possible except by reference to the system of law by which the




Since the contract had no express choice-of-law provision, precedent
dictated that the House of Lords look to the intent of the parties, as
determined "from the terms of the contract and the relevant surrounding
circumstances, to decide the applicable system of law.""
9
The court ruled that English law was the proper law of the con-
tract.'
93 
This reversed the ruling rendered by "experienced commercial
judges" of the appellate court, who had declined to apply English law due
to their determination that the policy represented an international con-
tract."
9  
Lord Wilberforce concurred in the ultimate decision of the
191. Amin Rasheed Shipping, Corp. v. Kuwait Insurance, Co., [19831 3 W.L.R. 241, 245
(emphasis added).
192. Id. at 246; The King v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders
Aktiengesellschaft, [19371 A.C. 500, 529.
Lord Dipleck discounted the importance traditionally reserved for both the lex loci
contractuas and the place of issuance of the contract, both of which were tied to Kuwait. The
House of Lords placed great weight on three other factors, First, the plaintiff had a related
business in England which acted as an intermediary for obtaining insurance. Second, the terms
of the contract incorporated much of an antiquated Lloyd's insurance policy which, according
to Lord Dipleck, made it impesible to look outside English law to interpret the codes and
policy. [1983] 3 W.L.R. at 248. As discussed later in the decision, Lord Wilberforce was not
persuaded by this observation and reliance on the Lloyd's policy, which contained "obsolete
and, in parts, unintelligible language." lIt Wilberforce noted that regardless of whether English
or Kuwaiti law was selected, reference would still have to be made to "English statute, custom,
and decisions" to interpret this portion of the contract. Id. at 254.
Lord Diplock also favored the application of English law since Kuwait did not have a
special maritime insurance law intact at the time the policy was issued. Id Once again Lord
Wilberforce placed less significance on this point, noting that the form of the contract is a
"factor to be considered" among many. id.
193. [1983] 3 W.L.R. at 254.
194. Id. at 249. On appeal, Lord Justice Goff held that the contract had taken on an
"international form" which provided "little connection with English law for the purpose of
ascertaining the proper law of the contract." Id. at 228, 249. Gof's position was noted by
Lord Wilberforce, who added:
It is well known, and not disputed, that this Lloyd's.policy is widely used, not only
in the British Commonwealth, or countries under British influence, but elsewhere,
including countries in Europe. It is regularly used in the Middle East and in the
Arabian Gulf. It is a strong thing to say that, in the absence of an express choice
of law clause, the proper law of all such policies is to be regarded by an English
court as English.
ld. at 255 (emphasis added).
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House of Lords, although his reasoning was based, "[w]ith no great
confidence," on an objective analysis of contacts.'
Regardless of the competing opinions in the proper law analysis, it
was clear that the English House of Lords refused to recognize the
agreement as an "international contract." As the court noted:
[C]ontracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum. They are
mere pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless they were
made by reference to some system of private law which defines
the obligations assumed by the parties to the contract ...."
Although contracts arguably cannot exist in a legal vacuum, the history of
the law merchant alone suggests that contractual obligations have existed
among merchants despite lacking a foundation in any single national law.
This point was noted by England's Court of Appeal in the decision of
Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. R'as Al Khaimah
National Oil Co., which upheld an ICC arbitral award based on "interna-
tional principles" governing "contractual relations. " "
9
The decision in Deutsche Srschtrbau involved myriad legal proceed-
ings in England, Switzerland, and R'as Al Khaimah. 9 ' The basis of the
various actions involved a dispute that arose out of an agreement for the
exploration of oil in R'as Al Khaimah. 199 A dispute eventually arose
with respect to the costs of drilling and other matters.'a The company
that drilled the wells, Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH
(DST), commenced arbitration proceedings in Geneva, Switzerland,
pursuant to the terms of the oil exploration agreement."5' R'as Al
Khaimah National Oil Company (RAKNOC) commenced separate
195. Id. at 255-56. As Lord Wilberforce concluded in Amin Rasheed, "I can find no basis
for inferring, as between the parties to the contract, an intention that the contract should be
governed either by English law or by the law of Kuwait." Id. at 253. He then set out on the
difficult task of "objectively" deterining the country to which the contract had its "closest and
most real connection." Id. at 255.
196. Id. at 249. See generally Mann, supra note 93.
197. Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tietbohrgesellschaft mbH V. Ens At Khaimah National Oi
Co., [1987] 2 All E.R. 769, revd in part, [19881 3 W.L.R. 230,
198. [19871 2 All E.R. at 769,771. Ras At Khaimah is a sheikdoms f the United Arab
Erirates. UAE Emirates Cuts Expatriate Salaries, Reuters, July 26, 1987.
199. Id. at 769, 774.
200. See id. at 772.
201. Id. at 772.
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proceedings in the Civil Court of Was Al Khaimah.an' Neither DST nor
RAKNOC responded to the other's proceedings, and judgments were
rendered in favor of the respective plaintiffs in both cases.
203
The dispute took an important twist in July 1986 when DST sought to
enforce the arbitration award in England against a third party, which also
had purchased oil from Raknoc and had outstanding debts to Rakoil in
England.' While the Court of Appeal's decision discussed various legal
issues, most prominent in its analysis was the discussion of the proper law
applied by the arbitrators in the arbitration award.'s Due to diversity of
contacts involved and the number of companies that were parties to the oil
concession, the arbitral tribunal concluded that they would refer to
what has become common practice in international arbitrations
particularly in the field of oil drilling concessions, and especially
to arbitrations located in Switzerland. Indeed, this practice, which
must have been known to the parties, should be regarded as
representing their implicit will."
In other words, the arbitration award was based on various international
decisions involving disputes over oil concessions.
RAKNOC argued in the Court of Appeal that it was "contrary to
English public policy" to uphold awards that had not been based on any
particular national law, but on some "unspecified, and possibly ill-defined
internationally acceptable principles of law.
"
'a Sir John Donaldson
rejected this contention and proceeded to establish a three-part test for
examining the validity of an agreement that was not governed by the laws
of England." This three-part test included: (1) whether the parties
intended to create a legally enforceable agreement; (2) whether the
resulting agreement constituted a legally enforceable contract; and (3)
whether enforcing the order would be contrary to public policy. -o The
202. Id. at 772.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See ict at 776-80.
206. Id. at 776 (emphasis added).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 779.
209. See id. The decision was appealed to the House of Lards regarding the question of the
issuance of the garnishment order. That portion of the decision was eventnally reversed by the
House of Lords. See [1988] 3 W.L.R. 230.
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court concluded that the agreement was enforceable despite the fact that the
rights and obligations were governed by general international principles
rather than a national system of law.1 Donaldson added:
Asking myself these questions, I am left in no doubt that the
parties intended to create legally enforceable rights and liabilities
and that the enforcement of the award would not be contrary to
public policy. That only leaves the questions of whether the
agreement has the requisite degree of certainty. By choosing to
arbitrate under the rules of the ICC, in particular, art. 133, the
parties have left the proper law to be decided by the arbitrators
and have not in terms confined the choice to national systems of
law. I can see no basis for concluding that the arbitrators' choice
of proper law, a common denominator of principles, underlying
the laws of the various nations governing contractual relations, is
out with the scope of the choice which the parties left to the
arbitrators.
23 '
The decision in Deutsche Schachtbau questions those English
precedents that have maintained that agreements involving the sale of
goods among various nations must be governed by a single national system
of law. Some may attempt to distinguish Deutsche Schachtbau from cases,
such as Amin Rasheed, that proffer the "system of law" approach by
arguing that the Deutsche Schachtbau decision involved an arbitration
agreement. This distinction, however, has only superficial merit since the
Court of Appeal's decision specifically rejected the traditional "system of
law" argument and upheld the right of parties not to confine their contract
to a single national system.
C. English Arbitration
The present state of the English Arbitration Act encourages a broader
use of law merchant principles, despite limitations by courts of law. A
review of arbitration in England also exposes the obstacles that merchants
face in adjudicating commercial disputes since the demise of the fair
courts.
Much of England's animosity toward an independent arbitration
210. [1987] 2 All E.R. at 779.
211. Id. Another phenomnenon and exception to traditional system of law rule conrers the
validity of the "floating choice-of-law" option. See generally Danilowicz, Floating
Choice-of-Law Clauses and Their Enforceability, 20 INT'L LAw. 1005 (1986).
72 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. [Vol. 12
system can be traced to the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854.2"2
The Act memorialized the "special case" procedure by which the arbitrator
or the parties could request judicial review of an arbitral award.
213 
The
special case procedure lasted for 125 years and extended to any "genuine
cas[e] regardless of the arbitrator's position to the challenge."" 4  The
result of the special case procedure was that English arbitration contained
many of the trappings of court adjudications. Moreover, the Act estab-
lished a scheme under which parties could potentially expend twice the
time and money-once before an arbitrator, and again before a court of
law-in adjudicating their dispute.
Despite revisions in the 1950 Arbitration Act, the special case
procedure was maintained.2" The system continued to cost merchants
additional time and expense. Indeed, some of the greatest abuses of the
special case procedure occurred during the past two decades, as illustrated
by the Hafldan Greig & Co. v. Sterling Coal & Navigation Corp.
decision.236  The parties in Hafidan requested that a special case be
stated concerning the construction of a contract.237 The arbitrators
rejected the request for a special case, commenting:
'We did not feel that this was a proper case to be so stated.
Whilst it may well be that there is a question of law, it is our
feeling that, whilst we do not presume to usurp the functions of
the court, it is more suitable for decision by a commercial
arbitration tribunal than by the courts since its interpretation is so
closely allied to commercial practice and the interpretation that
commercial men would give it.
'Counsel agreed that the court's decision would add nothing
to the wealth of law which is already available to us, and, as
there is no further principle of law involved, we feel it unneces-
sary, from the point of view of both time and expense, to trouble
212. Public General Acts, 1854, 17 & 18 Viet. 794, ch. 125.
213. Ch. 125, § IV of the Act stated that
[I]t shall be lawful for such Court or Judge to direct a Case to be stated, or an Issue
or Issues to be tried, and the Decision of the Court upon such Case, and the Finding
of the Jury or Judge upon such Issue or Issues, shall be taken and acted upon by the
Arbitrator as conclusive.
This procedure was retained in the Arbitration Act, 1935, 24 & 25 Gen. 5, ch. 14, § 9,
214. M. MusTiLL & S. Bove, supra note 11, at 532.
215. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Gen. 6, ch. 27.
216. Hafldan Grieg & Co. v. Sterling Coal & Navigation, Corp., [1973] I Q.B. 843.
217. Id. at 844.
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their lordships further. We have also decided to delay the issue
of our award for 14 days so that the parties may, if they wish,
apply to the court.'"
Justice Kerr agreed with the arbitrators' assessment, emphasizing the
simplicity of the issue when the case came before the Court of Appeal.1 9
Lord Denning, however, differed with the Court of Appeal and announced
a test for invoking special case review involving a disputed issue of law.
The point of law should be real and substantial and such as to be
open to serious argument and appropriate for decision by a court
of law; . . as distinct from a point which is dependent on the
special expertise of the arbitrator or umpire ....
The point of law should be clear cut and capable of being
accurately stated as a point of law-as distinct from the dressing
up of a matter of fact as if it were a point of law.
The point of law should be of such importance that the resolution
of it is necessary for the proper determination of the case-as
distinct from a side issue of little importance.?0
Denning's position left little room to argue against judicial review of
questions of law raised in arbitrations. Following the decision, arbitrators
218. Id. at 848.
219. ld. at 854. Kerr added:
But I do not regard the arbitrators' language as any indication that they are liable
to misconstrue the agreement, so as to lead me to the conclusion that they should
on this ground be directed to state a special case. I think that they merely mean
that because this agreement lies in their specialist field, they are quite capable of
interpreting it correctly. With this I agree. I have come to the conclusion that in
all the circumstances of this case the proper exercise of the discretion is that I
should not direct the statement of a special case. The sole issue is the proper
comparison of the eamings of a vessel under two time charters. The problem of
constuction is simply whether under the agreement of November 4, 1964, the
earnings are to be compared solely on a cash basis, or whether certain adjustments
require to be made to achieve the comparison which the parties intended. Although
this isse undoubtedly mises a question of law, I think it is one which is well within
the experience and capacity of this tribunal, which has great experience of legal
disputes relating to shipping matters, including of course, many questions of
construction of agreements in this field.
220. Id. at 862 (citations omitted).
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regularly accorded special case privileges to all but "frivolous requests"
because of a fear of having their actions 'considered as 'misconduct"' and
having the eventual award reversed.
"  
Denning's warning against
"dressing up a matter of fact as if it were a point of law" was of little
moment, as evidenced by the decision in Ismail v. Polish Ocean Lines."
In Ismail, the special case procedure was used to present a purely
factual question to the Court of Appeal. The underlying arbitration hearing
resulted in an award of £14,000 to a charterer, representing two-thirds of
the cost of the total loss.
2
" The appeal contested only the quantum of
damages."
4 
On review, the appellate court held that the charterer could
have no recovery because the shipper's captain had been promised that the
charterer would hold the shipper harmless for damages arising out of the
packaging and storage of the cargo.' Since the loss resulted from
spoilage of the cargo (potatoes), the court ruled that the charterer was
estopped from claiming any damages due to improper storage." Of
greater import, however, was the court's observation concerning the nature
of the factual issue presented. The court stated that
[i]f the findings of fact, when made, give rise to the question of
law which ought to be decided in order to do justice between the
parties, then that question is a 'question of law arising in the
course of the reference.' And I see no reason why the court
should not itself amend the question or formulate it afresh-at the
request of one or bath of the parties-so that the real issues
between them can be decided: provided, of course, that the facts
are sufficiently found for the purpose.'
2
The signal emanating from Ismail was clear: the special case procedure
was available for review of almost any case where controverted facts led
to a tangential question of law. This allowed a reviewing court to
221. W. CRAIG, W. PARK, & J. PAUsSSON, supra note 1, pt. V, § 29.03, at 471 (citing
CoMMERcIAL CouRT CoMMrrIEe, REPoRT ON ARarrnAnON, 1978, CMNDo. 7284, at 6 n.3
(1978)).
222. Ismail v. Polish Ocean Lines, [1976] 1 Q.B. 893.
223. Id. at 895.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 894.
226. ld.
227. Sd. at 901. The lower court had also noted that "It]he present case, like others in the
past, is one in which time has been spent in argument, and some difficulty has arisen, as to
whether or not a crucial and obvious question of law is open on the questions as franed." Id
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"formulate afresh" the issues between the parties.
Displeasure with the special case procedure came from various fronts,
including Lord Diplock, who voiced his concern over the abuse of the
special case review in 1978.' In Parliament, a more pragmatic concern
was posited by Lord Cutlen, who asserted that the nation lost as much as
£500,000 a year in fees and subsidiary costs due to the arbitrations that
avoided London because of the stated case provisions. 9
In 1979, significant amendments were made to the existing arbitration
statutes, including the elimination of the case stated procedure and High
Court review.
23' 
Although it appears that the risk of London losing its
position as a primary arbitration site was a significant consideration, the
revisions also reflected the needs of modem commerce. Like the traders
of the medieval era, modem merchants avoided arbitration in England
because the case stated procedure tended to hamstring litigation for an
unacceptable period. The landmark revisions to the English arbitration law
afforded greater independence to the arbitration system. This independence
was also expanded by the establishment of a "non-domestic" arbitration,
which allowed parties to forego judicial review of their award. 3'
Pursuant to the new enactments, parties to a "non-domestic" arbitration
may avoid judicial review by entering into an "exclusion agreement. "232
Non-domestic or foreign arbitrations are implicitly defined as those which
are not domestic arbitrations. 3 A non-domestic arbitration may exclude
judicial review either before or after the arbitration commences.23'
The language of the 1979 Arbitration Act is, in certain parts, unclear.
228. W. CRAIG, W. PARK, & J. PAULssoN, supra note I, pt. V, § 29.01, at 467 (citing
Address by Lord Diplnck, the Fourth Alexander Lecture, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators,
London (28 February 1978)), See generally Park, supra note 3, at 93-96.
229. W. CRAIG, W. PARK, & J. PAULSSON, sUpra note 1, pt. V, § 29.01, at 467-68 (citing
392 PARL. H.L. 99 (Sth Sew,. 1978)).
230. Arbitration Act, 1979, rh. 42, § 1.
231. Id. at § 3(1)-(2). This includes cases involving fraud. Id. at § 3(3).
232. Id.
233. A domestic arbitration is defined as
[Aln arbitration agreement which does not provide, expressly or by implication, for
arbitration in a State other than the United Kingdom and to which neither-
(a) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any
State other than the United Kingdom, nor
(b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central
management and control is exercised, in any State other than the United
Kingdom, is a party at the time the arbitration agreement is entered into.
Id. at § 3(7).
234. Id. at § 3(2), (6).
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The vagueness of the Act is especially apparent when analyzing Parlia-
ment's attempt to define "non-domestic" or foreign arbitrations as those
which are not domestic. The statute implies that the nationality of the
parties determines whether an arbitration is non-domestic. In contrast,
other national arbitration statutes examine the "international commercial
interests" to determine whether the arbitration is domestic or internation-
al.
23 
Despite the more restrictive nature of the 1979 Act, the amend-
ments have had the desired effect of enhancing London's position as a
situs for international arbitral adjudications. 23 The remaining prob-
lem, however, is that parties who agree to exclude judicial review of a
non-domestic award may be preempted from having written reasons
accompany the award. The preclusion of reasoned awards limits the
ability of arbitration awards to serve as a source of new decisional law,
which is inconsistent with providing precedents in transnational matters.
This is a curious result. A desire to exclude judicial supervi-
sion has nothing to do with the exclusion of a right to be given
reasons. Much of the motive power for the change in proce-
dure came from those 'transnational' corporations whose
disputes were conceived as standing above and outside the
ordinary rules of domestic justice. It is precisely such disputes
that will be of sufficient complexity to call for reasoned
awards.
237
As a result of the 1979 Act, arbitration proceedings have been distanced
from judicial review. Decisions, such as the one rendered in Pioneer
Shipping Ltd. v. B.T.P. Tioxiode (The Nemma),
23' 
represent the limited
scope of judicial review, which results under the 1979 Act.
The Nemma was the initial case to reach the House of Lords under
235. See FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, art. 1492; Carbonneau, ArbitralAdjdication:
A Comparaire Assessment of ts Remedial and Substantive Statss in Transnational Commerce,
19 TEx. INT'L U. 33, 67, 77 (1984).
236. For a ditcussion of the increase in ICC adjudication following the 1979 amendments
see W. CRAiG, W. PAR.K, & J. PAULSSON, supra note 1, pt. V, § 29.01, at 465.
237. See M. Musii. & S. BOYD, supra note 111, at 554 n.13; Arbitration Act, 1979, §
1(6). The fact that the parties may exclude both appellate review and the court's right to order
r ned awards saggests that the Act may be used to conduct an arbitration based upon
amiable composition. Id. at §§ 3(l)(b), 1(5)(b).
238. Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. B.T.P. Tioxide (The Nemna), [1980 1 Q.B, 547, aff',
[19811 2 All E.R. 1030.
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the new Act.
239 
This case raised the issue of whether labor strikes in
Canada had frustrated a contract.
240 
If the contract had been frustrat-
ed, the owner would have been allowed to take possession of its vessel.
Although the arbitrator found that the contract had been frustrated the
High Court, on appeal, disagreed and reversed the arbitrator's rul-
ing.
2
" The House of Lords, however, reversed the High Court and
sided with the arbitrator, even though his decision may not have been
legally correct.
2" 
The House of Lords ruled that an arbitrator was to
be granted deference under the new Act unless, according to Lord
Denning, "the arbitrator misdirected himself in point of law or ... the
decision was such that no reasonable arbitrator could reach."
243
Although the decision in The Nemma did not involve an exclusion
agreement provided for under the 1979 Act, the case is emblematic of
England's softening position with regard to trade, commercial arbitra-
tion, and judicial review. Recognizing that the 1979 Act was "very
different" from its predecessor, Lord Denning concluded:
Looking back on it now-with knowledge of all that has hap-
pened since-it is, I think, a pity that the judge gave
leave-and a pity too that we affirmed his decision. By
granting leave, the parties have been involved in much litiga-
tion and expense-which they ought to have been spared.
244
The deference shown the arbitrator in Nemma is representative of
the change in English tolerance toward arbitration. However, the
statutory provisions regarding "non-domestic" arbitrations are even more
significant in light of international commerce and the revitalization and
extension of the law merchant.
It has been suggested that English domestic law has limited the use
of custom and other attempts to "internationalize" certain types of
transnational disputes. A comparison of the decision in Amin Rasheed,
Deutsche Schachtbau, and the new arbitration procedures (particularly
239. [19811 2 All E. at 1030.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1031.
242. [1980 1 Q.B. 547, 561. Lord Dening stated: "in strict law, the Nemma should have
waited there . . . queuing up there-until the strike ended. This would be at the owner's
expense: becaose the charterets were esempt from any liability for lime last by reason of the
strike clause." Id.
243. id. at 566.
244. Id. at 564.
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the ability to exclude judicial review of non-domestic contracts) suggests
some incongruity in English law in this area. The 1979 Arbitration Act
allows parties to exclude awards from judicial review.
245 
Thus, since
arbitrators are effectively insulated from judicial review in a convention-
al international arbitration held in England, there is little to limit them
from using principles of the law merchant to reach a decision. (The
arbitrator of course, is still limited by the terms of the contract or the
arbitration agreement.) The Deutsche Schachtbau decision further
enhanced the arbitration system by giving preference to international
principles in lieu of domestic law provisions.'
A deep historical link exists between the law merchant and English
common law. However, when the law merchant was absorbed into the
common law, reference to custom and usages was restricted. Arbitration
ceased to be a true alternative for merchants because the entire process
was subject to judicial review. The recent amendments to the Arbitra-
tion Act not only expedite the resolution of commercial disputes but also
allow parties and arbitrators to use transnational customs and trade
usages to render decisions free from the coercive element of judicial
review.
English law governing arbitration and traditional court adjudication
suggests some inconsistency when contemplating the place of custom,
trade usage, and "international principles." On the one hand, court
decisions reject a broad interpretation of customary law or the possibility
of an "international contract"-as seen in Amin Rasheed and other cases
dealing with proper law/conflicts-of-law analysis. On the other hand,
English arbitration law has removed the specter of judicial review from
arbitration awards, including awards based on law merchant principles
or anational principles. These awards are recognized and enforced under
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, except in the very limited number of cases that
raise public policy exceptions."
Since present English commercial law allows for some reflection on
custom and usages, international commercial contracts, which do find
their way into English common law courts, should be interpreted in light
of the common practices and customs envisioned in the modern law
merchant. This would include a move toward the reasoning applied in
Deutsche Schachtbau and away from the Arnin Rasheed decision.
245. See supra note 230.
246. See supra note 208.
247. See supra note 83-85.
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IV: THE LAW MERCHANT, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Law Merchant in America
Prior to coming under complete English rule, the thirteen American
colonies maintained diverse substantive legal norms and institutions.
English, Dutch, French, and other national claims of sovereignty
necessarily meant that divisions would exist. The law merchant's
influence on the judiciary, however, was pervasive throughout the
colonial period and early statehood. On an institutional level, the
importance of mercantile customs and the merchant class was evidenced
by the fact that in two states, Georgia and North Carolina, merchants
litigated their commercial disputes in separate merchant courts.
2 48 
It
is also clear that principles found in the law merchant impacted heavily
on early American admiralty and negotiable instruments law. Similarly,
"contract and the law merchant ...acted as parents of the law of
sales."
249
Prior to the Revolution (and for some period thereafter), America
was a collection of loosely tied colonies, with its major cities and
industrial centers located on the eastern coast of the continent. Most
of the international commerce involving the colonies was conducted
through the ports of Boston, New York, and elsewhere along the
Atlantic seaboard. Because America was dependent on products
shipped from England and the Continent to build its nascent industries,
trade was crucial. Moreover, the growth of the American economy
necessitated the development of its commercial laws, especially in the
maritime field.
Trade was in fact international .... Commerce was, in large
measure, ocean commerce, the customs and documents of trade
were also those of ocean commerce. The received law of
admiralty and ocean trade was part of the stock in trade of a
developing country with its door to the sea. Law was a vital
segment of the infrastructure.
25
1
248. Butel, The Development of State Statutes on Negotiable Paper Prior to the Negotiable
Instruments Law, 40 COLUM. L REv. 836, 843 (1940).
249. L. FRocMAN, A HISTORY oF Ammu.cAN LAW 262 (2d ed. 1985).
250. Id. at 258.
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Indeed, admiralty law holds a unique place in American history, as
evidenced by its mention in the United States Constitution." Unlike
England's Parliament, which earlier had deferred to the courts and
divested itself from taking a leading role in developing private commer-
cial law,
2 
the United States Congress took the lead, making the
admiralty/maritime branch of the law merchant a source of federal
concern under the United States Constitution.
2 53
The unification of admiralty law under the Constitution was instru-
mental in achieving both international and domestic objectives. On the
domestic side, coastal and inter-coastal shipping played a central role
in the commercial growth of the new nation. Thus, to ensure fairness
in the resolution of interstate rivalries and prejudices, uniform national
guidelines in the shipping industry became necessary. The 1824
landmark decision of Gibbons v. Ogden25. was a critical step in
limiting state encroachment into interstate commerce.
In Gibbons, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York
statute, that granted to Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston a monopo-
ly to run a steamship line between points in New York and New
Jersey.S The state law failed to pass constitutional muster because
it infringed on Congress's authority over matters of shipping and its
broader powers over interstate commerce.
6  
Therefore, the Gibbons
court acknowledged the need for federal control over interstate
commercial shipping in lieu of localized state control.
The propagation of a federal admiralty law was also important on
an international level. For example, in 1815, a vessel was seized for
violating the federal embargo laws.
27 
As Friedman surmised, "admi-
ralty law was not a game; it was, among other things, a branch of
foreign policy. Decisions on prize law, neutrality, and the embargo
251. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. I.
252. G. KEEroN, .supra note 143, at 174.
253. The United States Consuttion insures that the power of the federal judiciary "shall
extend ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. In, § 2, cl. 1.
The power of the federal legislature is even more clear: "Congress possesses the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and it is well-settled law
that the word 'commerce,' as used in the Constitution, comprehends navigation and that it
extends to every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations . . .. " Cox v. Lott (The Collector), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 214 (1871).
254. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The Brig Short Staple & Cargo v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 55, 56 (1815).
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were its meat and drink."2 9 American admiralty law remains an
important field of national law, which is being developed both by the
legislative and judicial branches."
9
Negotiable instruments law and the law governing commercial
paper in the United States also were rooted in the law merchant,
although its impact varied from region to region. New England's
Puritan population, familiar with the practices of the English staple
courts, readily accepted business custom into their transactions
preferring custom over the "stuffy formalities of the common law ...
e265
Law merchant principles unknown in England guided the law
governing commercial paper in New York.
261 
To illustrate, early
American courts in some regions often confronted cases involving
"chattel notes" and "commodity paper."
262  
In another development,
"oral" bills of exchange were negotiated under the law merchant.
263
When England's declaration of sovereignty over all the colonies
was issued, a certain degree of uniformity crept into the commercial
law of the colonies. The language, the government, and the Anglican
church all assisted in the unification of colonial culture and its
institutions.
2
" English-speaking merchants also brought greater
standardization in the area of business during this period.
265
Despite the advancement of the English culture, the law governing
the commercial relations of the colonies did not adhere strictly to
English law as provided in the colonial charters.
2
" American admi-
258. L. FRIDMAN, supra note 249, at 260.
259. Even evidence of a "local custom" continues to have an impact on admiralty
jurispeudence. See, e.g., Mac Towing, Inc. v. American Commercial Lines, 670 F.2d 543, 546
(5th Cit. 1982).
260. Beutel, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable Instruments Law of the United States, 34
ILL. L. REV. 137, 141 (1939).
261. Dutch law had an important influence an both the law of notes and bills of exchange.
Due in part to this influence, "as early as 1655 ... the elements of both assignment and
negotiation [were] fully established in New York, over a centry ahead of a sinilar
development in England." Id. at 147.
262. L. FRIE DMAN, supra note 249, at 266 (citing Gareison v. Owens, 1 Pin. 471 (1844);
Rhodes v. Lindly. 3 Ohio 51 (1827)); Beutel, supra note 260, at 145.
263. F. POLtOcK, PRcic tcs OF CoNTRAc" AT LAW AND EQuIny 221 (citing Bank of
Kentucky v. Oaey, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 626 (1846); Kennon v. M'Rae, 7 Port 175 (Ala. 1838);
Beckman v. Wilson, 50 Mass. (9 Met) 434 (1845)). This development, while accepted within
the law meechant, was required to be in writing under statutory law. Id.
264. See Jones, supra note 32, at 459.
265. Betel, supra note 260, at 139.
266. Haskins, Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts, in Ton LIFE OF THE LAW:
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ralty and maritime matters followed English precedents, Continental
law, and the law merchant.
26'7 
General commercial law, and especial-
ly negotiable instruments law, however, developed under law merchant
principles that were often distinct from their English counterparts.
As English legal reports and English-trained solicitors came to the
New World, the colonies adopted more English common law norms.
Unfortunately, these principles did more to retard the growth of
negotiable instruments law than to advance its adaptation to a new land
and evolving commercial culture.
68 
England demonstrated "hostility"
toward the broad concept of negotiability established in American law,
but absent from the English Statute of Anne of 1704.269 Commercial
custom, however, still prevailed to varying degrees in cases involving
bills of exchange.
7
Following the American Revolution, the former colonies adopted
English common law in their jurisdictions.
71  
This trend not only
curtailed the use of custom, but also impeded the use of assignment and
negotiability of instruments in the nineteenth century. For example,
some former colonies prohibited the assignment of negotiable paper
without a deed;
22 
others proscribed the use of chattel paper.
273 
The
growth of negotiable instruments law was further stunted as the states
began to codify separate negotiable instruments laws, which varied in
their definitions of negotiability and other terms.'
74 The obvious need
for uniformity among the states led to the passage of the Uniform
ReADiNGs ON THE GROWTH OF LeoAL INSTiTuONS 48, 49-50 (J Honnold ed. 1964). Haslins
cites to a former unnamed Chief Justice ofPennsylvania, who stated in 1813 that
'(ilt required time and experience to ascertain how much of the English law would
be suitable to this country. By degrees, as circumstances demanded, we adopted
the English usages, or substituted others beter suited to our wants, till at length,
before the tie of the revolution, we had formed a system of our own.'
Id. at 50.
267. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 249, at 258. The law cootering the sale of goods also had
strong British tis. Id. at 262-69.
268. Beutel, supra note 260, at 148.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 149; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 249, at 266.
271. See generally Beutel, supra note 248, at 837-40. Parndoxically-or symbolical-
ly-many colonies repealed British statutes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Id. at 844.
272. Id. at 840 (citing Perkins v. Parker, I Mass. 117, 123 (1804)).
273. Id. at 840, 841 (citing Clark v. King, 2 Mass. 524 (1807)).
274. Id. at 854-64.
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Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896.275 The law was based upon
various state laws, commercial customs, and court decisions. Despite
the increased codification of commercial law, several Supreme Court
and lower court decisions continued to rely upon law merchant
principles in attempting to bring national uniformity to American
commercial law. The most noteworthy case involving law merchant
principles was Swift v. Tyson,
276 
decided in 1842.
Swift discussed the rights of a holder of a negotiable instru-
ment.
7 
Before addressing this issue, however, the Supreme Court
first established that it was not bound by state court judgments."'
According to Justice Story, state jurisprudence could not control
"general commercial law," which "in the language of Cicero ... [was]
in a great measure not the law of a single country only, but of the
commercial world."
279
Another nineteenth century decision, County of Mercer v. Hack-
ett,
2
1s presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to apply law
merchant principles to determine the negotiability of railroad bonds.
In rendering its decision, the Court relied on the law merchant to rule
that the defense of fraud could not defeat the rights of bona fide
holders of the bonds.
This species of bonds is a modem invention intended to pass
by manual delivery, and to have the qualities of negotiable
paper; and their value depends mainly upon this character.
Being issued by States and corporations, they are necessarily
under seal. But there is nothing immoral or contrary to good
policy in making them negotiable, if the necessities of
commerce require that they should be so. A mere technical
dogma of the courts or the common law cannot prohibit the
commercial world from inventing or using any species of
security not known in the last century. Usage of trade and
commerce are acknowledged by courts as part of the common
law, although they may have been unknown to Bracton or
Blackstone. And this malleability, to suit the necessities and
275. See generally id. at 849-53.
276. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
277. Id.
278. id. at 2.
279. Id. at 19.
280. County of Mercer v. Hackett, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 83 (1863).
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usages of the mercantile and commercial world, is one of the
most valuable characteristics of the common law.
28
'
Courts in the twentieth century continued to adhere to "the general law
merchant" to uphold the negotiability of commercial instruments.
8
The law merchant has not always found acceptance in American
jurisprudence. For example, limitations have been placed on the law
merchant in cases where an express statute ran counter to commercial
practice. Thus, in Manhattan Co. v. Morgan,' certain certificates
were held not to be negotiable because "[t]he law merchant [could] not
prevail against prohibitions specifically enumerated by public stat-
ulte.
- 284
Although uniform application of the law merchant was spawned by
the Swift v. Tyson decision, the Supreme Court has also limited the law
merchant's application in certain situations. For example, in Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Assoc. v. Parnell, the Court held
that in cases involving a dispute between private parties over federal
bonds, state law should govern issues such as whether there had been
good faith negotiation.' In dissent, Justice Black commented that
the "federal law merchant" should apply to all transactions involving
the commercial paper of the United States.' He concluded that
281. Id. at 95.
282. See National Metropolitan Bank v. United Staten, 323 U.S. 454, 457 (1945).
283. Manhattan, Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 209 N.Y.S. 861, 150 N.E. 591 (1926).
284. Id. at 49; Negotiable Instruments Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 38, §§ 20, 23, 24, & 29).
Despite the ultimate ruling, Justice Cardozo, the author of the opinion, expressed concern with
inhibiting the application of the law merchant. He elucidated:
We do not underrate the importance of permitting business to originate for itself the
methods and instrumentalities that may be found by experience to be helpful to its
free development ... .Ter is force in the argument that wider freedom of choice
through t e spontaneous flowerings of custom would work a social gain. One of
the debit items to be charged against codifying statutes is the possibility of
interference with evolutionary growth. It is the ancient conflict be ween flexibility
and certainty. So far as the Negotiable Instruments Law is concerned, the remedy
for the evil, if it be one, is an amendment of the statute that will add to the
negotiable instruments there enumerated or described such other classes as the law
merchant or the custom of the market may from time to time establish. Until such
an amendment shall be adopted, the courts in their decisions must take for granted
that the Legislature is content with the law as it is written.
242 N.Y. at 52.
285. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Assoc. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
286. Id. at 35.
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[t]he virtue of a uniform law governing bonds, notes, and other
paper issued by the United States is that it provides a certain
and definite guide to the rights of all parties rather than
subjecting them to the vagaries of the law of many States. 2 7
Fortunately, the unification of negotiable instruments law in article 3
of the Uniform Commercial Code remedied any discord that may have
resulted from this and similar decisions.
The importance of the law merchant to American negotiable instru-
ments law and general commercial law cannot be overstated. Through-
out the colonial period and especially in the eighteenth century, the
scarcity of hard currency made commercial paper the major convention
of exchange for the first 100 years of nationhood. By the nineteenth
century, commercial paper, especially personal promissory notes, was
the "chief American instrument of debt and credit.""
9
As in England, American courts embraced the concepts found in
the law merchant, and many of the law merchant's commercial
principles formed the basis of legislative enactments.
2 9  
As in
England, however, the absorption of the law merchant into statutory law
stifled the growth and evolution of commercial customs in the area of
promissory notes, bills of credit, and the general negotiability of
commercial paper."
°
B. The Uniform Commercial Code
When the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was being formulated
in the 1930s, it appeared that the drafters had successfully woven the
flexibility of commercial custom and the law merchant into a formal,
legislative enactment. First, the drafters of the UCC emphasized the
287. Id.
288. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 249, at 536.
289 Statutes include the Uniform Bill of Lading Act, ch. 415, § 1, 39 Stat. 538 (1916)
(current version at 49 U.S.C. § 81); United States Warehouse Act, ch. 313, pt. C, § 1, 39 Stat.
486 (1916) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 241); Uniform Sales Act of 1906 reprinted in F.
WHITNEY, LAW OF MODERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICeS 43 (2d ed. 1965) (as adopted by the
National Conference of Commsissioners on Uniform State Law); United States Bills of Exchange
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1928). See generally Note, supra note 4, at 141; 1 G. CAINes, AN
ENQUIRY INTO THE LAW MERCHANT OF THE UNITED STATES; On, LEX MERCATORIA
AMERICANA ON SEvERAL HEADS OF COMMERCIAL. MPORTANCE 462, 464-68, 483 (1802).
290. Beutel, supra note 248, at 845-47.
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law merchant principle of good faith dealing throughout the Code.
291
Second, and of greater importance to the present analysis, the UCC
provided that certain commercial transactions could be evaluated in
light of trade usages or the course of dealing between the contracting
parties.292 Such usages or course of dealings could prove determina-
tive in litigating rights and obligations under a given commercial
agreement. The Code provision that attempts to introduce the flexibili-
ty of custom into commercial transactions is found in section 1-205.
Section 1-205 specifically discusses the impact of "usage of trade"
between merchants.
293
The adaption of trade usage parallels the past practices of American
admiralty and nineteenth century negotiable instruments law in referring
to the law merchant and commercial customs. The UCC replaced the
term "custom" with the term "trade usage." Custom is a "non-consen-
sual" concept; that is, custom has the force of law between those in a
trade who knew or should have known of its existence. In contrast,
trade usage describes a "use of trade or local practice" that underlies
the parties' intent in formulating and interpreting their contract.
94
291. See generally U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3), 1-203, & 1-201(19).
292. U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
293. U.C.C. § 1-205 provides:
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded us establishing a common basis
of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will
be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope
of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is
embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing
is for the court.
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or
trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.
(4) The express terms of an agreemnent and an applicable ourse of dealing or usage
of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable s consistent with each other; but
when such construction is unreasonable express tertns control both course of dealing
and usage of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
(5) An applicable usage of trade in the place where any pars of performance is to
occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to that part of the performance.
(6) Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is not admissible
unless and until he has given the other party such notice as the court finds sufficient
to prevent unfair surprise to the latter.
fI
294. Levis, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1102 (1965). The use of the term "custom" was also seen as
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The term "trade usage" is more expansive than the term "custom."
Custom is normally applied to a specific trade's unwritten rules,
whereas "usage" may be more localized. The drafters of the Code
probably avoided the term "custom" so as not to endorse those cases
where custom was used to "displace or negate 'established rules of
law.'"
29 5 
In some ways, the UCC contemplates a more expanded
view for trade usage than did the English common law for custom.
Specifically, the UCC does not require that a usage be in existence
since "time immemorial" or that it be "universal."
29 6  
However, it is
not clear whether the Code treats trade usage as a source of indepen-
dent authority, as customs were treated in the medieval era under the
law merchant.2
Despite the broader definition ascribed to trade usage, American
courts have narrowly construed trade usage since the original compila-
tion of the UCC in 1936. Many decisions evidence a narrow construe-
too "blunt and confused to serve in careful analysis." Ua.; see Llewellyn, The Normative, the
Lega4 and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L. 1355, 1359 n.1 (1940).
295. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 4 (1981). This would confirm Justice Cardozo's view that
custom could not override mandatory public law as noted in Manhanan Co. v. Morgan, 242
N.Y. 38, 49 (1926).
296. U.cC. § 1-205 comment 5 (1981). 'New" usages may be shown without being
"universal" among merchants. I4 The Code only requires that the usage be "observed by the
great majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut corers do not agree." Id.
297. Whether tade usage can be a source of law as was custom with the law merchant, and
(to a leser degree) the English common law, is unclear. Upon reviewing U.C.C. § 1-205 and
comment 4, Levie suggested that the Cede did not "deal with nemconsensual common law
'custom' but only with 'trade usage.'" Levie, supra note 294, at 1106. This led him to
conclude that:
[The Code] does not consider [trade usage] an independent source of obligation or
authority and therefore rejects 'those cases which see evidence of "custom" as
representing an effort to displace or negate' established rules of law. Accordingly,
the Code is highly unsympathetic to traditional common law tests, which consider
"custom" an independent source of legal obligations and rights.
Id. at 1107.
Two points require further comment. First, it is submitted that comment 4 does not limit
trade usage, as Levie suggested. The limitation voiced in comment 4-that trade usage cannot
negate "'established rules of law'"--is more easily understood in a manner suggested by
Cardozo. Cadozo held that costo= cannot be controlling over established public mandatory
law. Second, Levie may have been correct in stating that trade usage cannot be considered an
"independent source of authority and obligation" as was English admiralty law, same early
commercial law and the law merchant. These bodies of law were given their birthright via
commercial customs. However, although moder trade usages may not presently fill an entire
field of law, it is difficult to dispute that they are not a "somce of obligation or authority." The
cases discussed within Part 111 deal with trade usage, which was viewed as binding. The only
hurdle same failed to clear arose from an issue involving parol evidence.
N.YL. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
tion-especially when compared to the use of commercial custom in
nineteenth century America or its development in modem international
arbitrations. This more narrow construction has resulted from a failure
to distinguish the difference in interpreting commercial contracts under
the UCC from traditional contract analysis.
Prior to adoption of the Code, contracts were subject to interpreta-
tion through legal formalism in which "the business community was
expected to conform actual practice to the formal rules."29' In
contrast, the Code sought to "reinstate the merchant as the main
arbitrator of commercial law; its golden age is the age of Lord
Mansfield and his merchantmen-juries. In a sense, the Code recreates
(or seeks to recreate) this institution."29
In the area of contract law, the UCC attempted to de-emphasize
formal legal rules and dependence on the written contract. Instead,
emphasis was to be placed on the trade usages and regular practices of
the parties.' Beyond reviewing the written document, courts inter-
preting commercial contracts were now required to "develop an
understanding of the commercial context of a disputed transaction, and
that understanding was the foundation for determining the parties'
actual expectations and the bargain in fact." Oi What has developed,
however, is a controversy over whether the Code's parol evidence rule
(section 2-202) limits the proof of trade usages under section 1-205(4)
in a given contract."°
The central issue involving section 1-205(4) is in determining when
and to what extent a particular trade usage may alter the written terms
of an agreement. The question that results is whether trade usage may
show "the existence of an additional written term" beyond that which
298. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course oDealing: Subversion ofthe UCC Theory, 1977 U.
ILL. L. REv. 811 (1977).
299. Friedman & Macaulay, Contrace Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present and Future,
1967 Wis. L. Rev. 805, 808 (1967).
300. Id. at 806-09.
301. Kirst, supra note 298, at 812.
302. Various commentators have generally noted the historic changes brought into contract
law under the UCC. See Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 51 OR. L. Rev. 269 (1972); Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 299. Others have
confted their writings to the effect of the parol evidence rule on the introduction of trade
usages. See generally Levie, supra note 294; Kirst, supra note 298, at 815.
it should be noted that in addition to the paral evidence issue, a second, leser problem
involving evidence of trade usages centers on the fact that some courts have erroneously applied
the pre-code common taw requirements of proof of custom to prove trade usage under UCC §
1-205(4). See Levie, supra note 294, at 1102.
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merely "define[s a word."
0 3 
Both the UCC section on parol evi-
dence, section 2-202, and the official comments suggest a broad
application of trade usage in interpreting contractual obligations.
Section 2-202 states:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in writing
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or
supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section
1-205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208);
and by evidence of consistent additional terms unless
the court finds the writing to have been intended also
as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of
the agreement.'
Moreover, the initial comment to section 2-202 provides that
This section definitely rejects:
(a) Any assumption that because a writing has been worked
out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as
including all the matters agreed upon;
(b)The premise that the language used has the meaning
attributable to such language by rules of construction existing
in the law rather than the meaning which arises out of the
commercial context in which it was used.. .. 305
The provision and comment offer a broad endorsement for understand-
ing the commercial backdrop of an agreement, including its unwritten
terms. Section 2-202 was written so that "it overrule[d] cases stating
that usage cannot add a new term to the contract."" A judge who
303. Kirst, supra note 298, at 815.
304. U.C.C. § 2-202.
305. td.
306. See Levie, supra note 294, at I I11.
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examines an agreement must not only look to the express terms of the
contract but also to the entire commercial setting in which the contract
was formulated. Both aspects are presumed to form the parties' intent
under the agreement.
Professor Llewellyn, a principal architect of the Code, also
advocated a much wider reliance on trade usage than that contemplated
under traditional contract law and parol evidence rules. In his 1941
draft, Llewellyn attempted to explain the concept of trade usage
envisioned under the Code.
'Wherever the usages of a particular trade or mercantile
situation have. in whole or in part, been reduced to fair and
balanced form by a body representing both buyers and sellers
of the character engaged in a particular transaction, the
incorporation of such body of usages into the transaction, as
the background of the particular terms of the bargain, is
presumed.''
o7
Llewellyn opposed restricting evidence of trade usages and went on to
suggest the formation of merchant juries, such as those employed by
Lord Mansfield."
Ultimately, the intent of the parties provides the basis of the
analysis applied to commercial contracts that come within the purview
of the Code. Such an analysis must consider the commercial nature of
the transaction underlying the agreement.
Before concluding that a jury could not reasonably find a
consistent construction, the judge must understand the com-
mercial background of the dispute. Because the stock printed
forms cannot always reflect the changing methods of business,
members of the trade may do business with a standard clause
in the forms that they ignore in practice. If the trade consis-
tently ignores obsolete clauses at variance with actual trade
practices, a litigant can maintain that it is reasonable that the




307. Kirst, supra note 298, at 822 (citing NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws, REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT, THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 55 (1941)).
308. Id. Other commentators also have advocated the re-introduction of commercial courts
similar to those of medieval times. See de Seife, A Plea for the Creation of a Commercial
Court, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 437 (1982).
309. Kirst, supra note 298, at 824. Kirst further adds:
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This analysis would seem to comport with Dixon, Irmaos & Cia v.
Chase National Bank,
310 a leading case decided in the early UCC era.
The Dixon suit concerned a shipment of cotton from Brazil to
Belgium." The agreement involved two letters of credit issued by
Chase National Bank of New York."' One of the letters provided for
the delivery of "[f]ull set bills of lading."
313  
When the plaintiff's
representative presented various documents to the bank, one of two bills




The bank refused to
accept an indemnity agreement in place of the missing bill of lading
and refused to pay the amounts due under the letters of credit,
contending, among other things, that the bills of lading were incom-
plete.
31 5
The trial court held that the plaintiff's presentation of a single bill
of lading did not conform to the express terms of the letters of
credit.
31 6 
In so ruling, the court rejected evidence of a custom among
New York banks, exporters, and importers to recognize guaranty
agreements as substitutes for "a missing bill of lading."
31 7
On appeal, the court first noted that the law mandated "strict
compliance" with the terms of the document and that custom could not
vitiate the terms of the written agreement.
1
' The court concluded,
however, that custom should have been considered, noting that
it is also well settled 'that parties who contract on a subject
matter concerning which known usages prevail, incorporate
such usages by implication into their agreements, if nothing is
said to the contrary . . . . In our opinion the custom under
consideration explains the meaning of the technical phrase
An additional effort is required to understand the commercial background to learn
the conduct of members of the trade or the parties to the suit in past dealings when
the usage and the writing conflicted. A reasonable construction is not dependent
on the formal logic of work [sicl matching but on the entire contract context
Id. at 825.
310. Dixon, Irmaos & Cia v. Chase National Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944).
311. Id. at 760.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 761.
315. id.
316. Id. at 763.
317. Id. at 761-62.
318. Id. at 761.
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'full set of bills of lading' and is incorporated by implication
into the terms of the defendant's letters of credit.
19
In resurrecting the rationale behind the early fair courts, which relied
on commercial custom to hasten the resolution of mercantile disputes,
the court concluded that honoring commercial customs was "essential
to the expeditious doing of business in overseas transactions i  these
days when one part of the bill of lading goes by air and another by
water."
320
Llewellyn approved of the approach used by the Second Circuit in
Dixon because the Dixon court went beyond the four comers of the
agreement to interpret the contract and actually allowed unwritten
usages to prevail over the written text.
3 1
' Dixon has further signifi-
cance because the decision involved a national court's application of a
trade usage to interpret an international agreement.322
Despite the legislative history, numerous commentaries, and early
cases such as Dixon, modem courts continue to utilize the UCC parol
evidence rule to exclude evidence of relevant trade usages. This
practice persists despite the fact that section 2-202 proscribes only the
introduction of contradictory prior agreements or "contemporaneous
oral agreement[s]," not trade usages.
32 3 
Judicial failure to compre-
hend the modification that section 1-205(4) has made to traditional
contract interpretation and to the parol evidence rule is apparent in
numerous cases.
One early decision that mistakenly applied the UCC parol evidence
rule to exclude evidence of a trade usage was Division of Triple T
Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp."m In Triple T, the plaintiff sought
319. Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
320. Id.
321. Kirst, supra note 298, at 829. Other cases have applied similar reasoning as used in
Dixon. See Ricker v. U.S., 115 P. Supp 193 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d
627 (Or. 1932); Kunglig Jaxnvagstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 991
(S.D.N.Y. 1924); Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 196 Pa. Super. 180,
173 A.2d 780 (1961) (Ervin, J., dissenting).
322. The UCC modified the Uniform Sales Act to make it "more suitable to international
trade." Berman & Kaufman, upra note 3, at 228 (citing I N.Y.L. REvISIoN COMMISSION,
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 348 (1955)).
323. See UCC § 2-202; Kirst, supra note 298, at 832-36.
324. Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d
191 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1969).
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to enjoin the defendant from terminating a franchise agreement.
3 25
The contract provided that the franchise would be maintained for a
three-year period and would be automatically renewed at the end of the
initial period.
326 However, the agreement also provided that either
party could terminate the relationship on the condition that notice be
given ninety days prior to termination.
2
'
The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence of commercial custom
to prove that franchising agreements, such as the one in question, could
be terminated only upon a show of cause.
32
" The court rejected the
evidence of custom because the agreement was not ambiguous."'
Thus, the court mistakenly concluded that
the Code itself codifies the well established rule in the law of
contracts that evidence of custom or usage in the trade is not
admissible where inconsistent with the express terms of the
contract .... At bar the express terms of the contract cover
the entire area of termination and negate plaintiff's argument
that the custom or usage in the trade implicitly adds the words
'with cause' in the termination clause. The contracts are
unambiguous and no sufficient basis appears for a construction
which would insert words to limit the effect of the termination
clause .... Only language consistent with the tenor of the
otherwise complete agreement is admissible under the guise of
'custom and usage' and the Code effects no change in that
doctrine. Accordingly, the parol evidence rule precludes
plaintiff from offering evidence that would vary and change
the express terms of the written agreements."
0
Another significant case that misconstrued section 1-205(4) was
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.
3
' In Royster, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to determine the parties' obliga-
tions under a contract for the purchase of phosphate over a three-year
325. Id.
326. Id. at 194.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 195.
329. Id. at 204.
330. Id at 203 (emphasis added); see Lipsehutz v. Gordon Jewelry Corp., 373 F. Supp. 375,
387 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
331. Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
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period.
332 Due to changes in market conditions, the buyer breached
the contract by refusing delivery of a quantity of phosphate.
333 
The
trial court refused to hear testimony concerning trade usage in the
"mixed fertilizer industry."
334 
Such testimony allegedly would have
shown that due to the instability of the farming industry and other
variables, the express terms of the contract were "mere projections to
be adjusted according to market forces."
33
In reversing the trial court, the Fourth Circuit properly observed
that the UCC altered past case law. These changes included "a more
liberal approach to the introduction of parol evidence. ... 336
Unfortunately, the appellate court gave a faulty rationale for admitting
the evidence, indicating that the admissibility of usages or course of
dealings depended on whether either could be "reasonably . . .
construed as consistent with the express terms of the agreement."
333
This observation was inappropriate in that the contract was complete on
its face; in fact, it was the existence of the trade usage that prompted
the subsequent breach.
The court allowed parol evidence because the contract did not
expressly prohibit reference to either trade usage or course of deal-
ing.
3
"' "[T]his neutrality provide[d] a fitting occasion for recourse to
usage of trade and prior dealing to supplement the contract and explain
its terms."
339 
Although the court described the contract as neutral
regarding trade usage or course of dealing, the admissibility of such
evidence should not have been based on the mere fact that the contract
omitted reference to trade usage or course of dealing. Apparently, the
Fourth Circuit equated neutrality with the absence of a specific clause
prohibiting reference to trade usage or course of dealing. According to
this reasoning, trade usage or course of dealing was consistent with the
contract and could be used to explain it. However, this formulation is
incorrect in that it overstates when evidence regarding trade usage or
course of dealing may be admitted.
332. Id. at 6.
333. id. at 7.
334. Id. at 8.
335. Id. at 7.
336. Id. at 9.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 10; see Heggblade-Marguleas-Tesneco, Inc. v.Sunshine Biscuit Inc., 59 Cal.
App. 3d 948, 131 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976).
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Following the reasoning in Royster, all trade usages tangentially
related to a commercial transaction would be admissible so long as the
preferred usage is not expressly discussed or limited in the agree-
ment.
34 Such an approach is inconsistent with the UCC. Under the
Code, contract interpretation includes both an examination of the
language of the contract and the background (including usages) of the
particular commercial transaction. Therefore, unlike the methodology
applied in Royster, the Code contemplates the admission of a trade
usage only where it is consistent with the terms of the agreement or the
commercial background of the contract.
The Royster reasoning is also suspect in determining when to limit
evidence of trade usage. To illustrate, Royster held that evidence of
unwritten trade usages was inadmissible where it contradicted an
express term of the contract." (In Royster, usage was admissible in
that there was no express provision addressing changes in farm
practices, government policies, weather, and other conditions.) Under
the UCC, however, even in cases where a usage apparently contradicts
an express term, evidence of the usage cannot be excluded per se. The
court must first make the proper inquiry into the commercial back-
ground of the transaction before excluding evidence of trade usage.
342
Therefore, Royster is incorrect on two counts: (1) the ruling is too
expansive because it allows evidence of every trade usage so long as
the contract does not specifically discuss the usage, and (2) its
reasoning is too narrow in that it per se excludes evidence of usage or
course of dealing when such evidence contradicts an express term.
In rendering decisions based on the present Code, the modern
courts have failed to reference trade usages that exist among today's
340. See Duesenberg, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Documents of itle, 28
Bus. LAw. 805, 824 (1973). The commentary succinctly notes the open-endedness of the
Roystr opinion;
What this case obviously does is transfer the fortunes of contracting parties into the
hands of lawyers. To the one with the most painstaking draftsmanship go the
rewards of this case. Every conceivable type of parol evidence must be expressly
negated, at the pril of its admissibility in negation of a writing. An approach to
the specifics of this case might be to negate expressly the relevance of any coarse
of dealing or trade usage, but one has hesitancy that a court of the Royster leniency
would necessarily fCod this adequate in all circumstances. Failing such air-tight
construction, writings are by this decision subject to being brken by disappointed
parties offering testimony of alleged customs or course of dealings, hoping always,
of course, that the quantum of evidence offered might be adequate to get to a jury.
Id.
341. Id.
342. Kirst, supra note 298, at 824.
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merchants. The laws of the several states, synthesized within the UCC,
support the admission of trade usages and course of dealings when
adjudicating commercial disputes. Similarly, the proper application of
section 1-205(4) would better accommodate the needs of business.
Unfortunately, American jurisprudence, as highlighted by decisions
involving section 1-205(4), has hindered such a development. As Levie
concludes:
the law of custom has become fossilized. There has been
almost no development in the past century. On the contrary,
there has been a very real retrogression because the rules for
common law custom have been applied to cases of trade usage
and in the process have been brought into disrepute as too
harsh and mechanical or too stretched and diluted.
34 3
A re-examination of the history of section 1-205(4) and sec-
tion 1-202 would provide the basis for a current infusion of trade
usages and course of dealings to assist in resolving commercial
disputes. Such a result would supplement the body of American
commercial law. Moreover, in cases involving international contracts,
U.S. courts could assist in the development of transnational commercial
law.
C. American Attitudes Toward Arbitration
In addition to the law merchant, trade usages, and custom,
arbitration has historically played a leading role in the development of
American mercantile law,
Arbitration has a rich past in American commerce, pre-dating the
establishment of the republic. When the Dutch claimed sovereignty
over New York, a group of nine arbitrators "constituted the court of the
colony," which lasted well into the mid-seventeenth century.
344
Municipal chambers of commerce and similar merchant groups
spearheaded much of the movement toward arbitration as a means of
resolving commercial disputes. One of the most prominent of these
was the New York Chamber of Commerce. The objective of the
Chamber was memorialized in the organization's bylaws in 1768, which
proclaimed that
343. Levie, supra note 294, at 1116.
344. Jones, Three Centuries of CommercialArbitration in New York, A Brief Survey, 1956
WASH. U.L.Q. 193, 195 (1956).
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'Mercantile Societies have been found very useful in Trading
Cities for promoting and encouraging Commerce, Supporting
industry, Adjusting disputes relative to Trade and Navigation
and procuring such Laws and regulations as may be found
necessary for the benefit of Trade in general.' "
In order to effectuate these goals, members of the New York Chamber
established an in-house arbitration committee for the purpose of
resolving disputes."
The use of arbitration between merchants became standardized in
the nineteenth century. Various groups of merchants instituted their
own arbitration procedures. Such groups included the New York Stock
Exchange, followed by the Cotton Exchange, Mercantile Exchange, and
others. Each group eventually established private arbitration procedures
for resolving disputes among its members."' By the twentieth
century, arbitral adjudication not only became enshrined in charters of
private organizations, but also secured a place in federal law."
The contributions of various merchant groups and exchanges in the
eighteenth century greatly assisted the progression of private arbitration
in America. In the present century, however, possibly the most
significant developments in arbitration have come through the courts,
not through private enterprise. Various decisions, especially those of
the Supreme Court, have reflected a great deference to arbitration
agreements and, most notably, the process of international arbitration.
This deference is especially evident in cases involving transnational
commercial contracts; it demonstrates a shift in the United States
position regarding international arbitration since its opposition to the
1958 New York Convention."
Recent decisions involving questions of international arbitration are
significant in that they indicate the American judiciary's new apprecia-
tion of disputes involving international trade. The decisions also evince
345. Id. at 207 (citing COLONIAL REcoaOs OF THE NEw YORK CHAMBER OFCOMMERCE
1768-84 (J. Stevens ed. 1867)).
346. Id. at 207.
347. Id. at 217. "Thus in the nineteenth century there was a development of special private
mercantile tribunals in which the bulk of mercantile disputes was sealed entirely outside the
state judicial system." Jones, supra note 30, at 463.
348. The Federal Arbitration Act is codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1925). For a thorough
discussion of the history of arbitration law, see generally Wolaver, 3e Historical Background
of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 132 (1934).
349. See van Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 3 INT'L Aw. 320, 321 (1969).
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a willingness to allow American merchants to be subjected to foreign
law. Certain decisions have gone so far as to uphold arbitration
agreements involving international contracts, despite assertions that the
agreements invade the province of national courts and national interests.
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has granted special
status to those contracts that involve international agreements. Most
illustrative of this special status is the decision rendered in Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co."'
The action in Scherk involved a contract between Alberto-Culver,
an American corporation, and Scherk, a German citizen who resided in
Switzerland."i The contract involved the sale of three of the defend-
ant's businesses that were incorporated under the laws of Germany and
Liechtenstein.
52  
After eighteen months of negotiations, which
occurred throughout Europe and the United States, the parties ultimately
consummated an agreement in Vienna, Austria."
3  
The contract
contained a clause that subjected any claims arising under the agree-
ment to arbitration pursuant to the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) rules.
354
A controversy between the parties ensued when the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant breached certain warranties under the contract.355
An action was eventually brought in United States federal court based
upon provisions of the American securities laws.
354 
The defendant
contended, among other things, that the action should be stayed pending
arbitration under the ICC provisions.5 7 The lower court denied the
motion, which was later upheld by the appellate court.35 The courts
based their decisions on Wilko v. Swan,
359 
which had established that
an agreement to arbitrate could not preempt the right of a purchaser of
350. Scherk v. Alberto-Culve, Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).




355. Id, at 509.
356. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. 1, § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (cunrent version 15
U.S C. § 78j(b) (1989)); Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1988).
357. 417 U.S. at 506.
358. id. at 510.
359. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko the parties and pertinent transactions
were all connected to the United States. d.
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securities to a "judicial remedy" under the Securities Act of 1933.3"
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts, concluding
that Wilko v. Swan was distinguishable from Scherk because Scherk
involved "a truly international agreement." 6'
The Supreme Court decision noted the several contacts with various
countries throughout Europe and that the companies were organized
under foreign laws.
362 
This was a distinguishing characteristic from
Wilko v. Swan, which stated that
no credible claim could have been entertained that any interna-
tional conflict-of-laws problems would arise. In this case
[Scherk], by contrast, in the absence of the arbitration provi-
sion considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the
agreement, and still exists, concerning the law applicable to
the resolution of disputes arising out of the contract.
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to
any contract touching two or more countries, each with its own
substantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules.
363
The Court further noted that Americans who conduct business and enter
into transnational contracts cannot always guarantee for themselves
access to American courthouses to protect their interests in "world
markets.' 3" Such access, especially where the parties had agreed to
arbitration, would "demea[n] the standards of justice elsewhere in the
world, and unnecessarily exal[t] the primacy of United States law over
the laws of other countries."
365
360. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77-1 (1989)).
361. 417 U.S. at 519-20.
362. Id. at 515.
363. 1d. at 516.
364. Id.
365. fd at 518 n.t 1. The court echoed the earlier sentiments it had enunciated in the
landmark decision of MIS Bremen v. Zapaa Off-shore, 407 U.S. 1,9 (1972), where the Court
concluded: "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."
The decision in Scherk was extended in 1985 when the Supreme Court upheld an
arbitration clause that subjected American antitrust claims to arbitration in acc rdance with the
Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association. See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Ply-
mouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
In Mitsubishi, t e Supreme Court explained that the American Arbitration Act "was
designed to overcome an anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate which
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The deference shown by the Supreme Court to the international
arbitral system over the past decade not only establishes the efficacy of
the arbitration alternative, but also the Court's growing reluctance to
bring foreign litigants before American courts and to force the
application of American substantive law upon private transnational
agreements. Moreover, other lower court decisions have taken the
Supreme Court's lead and have shown even greater restraint by
enforcing transuational commercial agreements, which would be void
under domestic law.
In Parsons Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De
L'Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA),'" the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed an arbitration award even though the contract violated
the domestic (national) interest of the United States.
6
' The issue in
Parsons concerned the validity of a force majeure clause within a
contract between an American and an Egyptian corporation."6  The
American company brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of an
arbitration award, arguing that the award was invalid because it
imposed penalties violative of American public policy.
69  
The
plaintiff contended that enforcement of the award was precluded under
the public policy exemptions of article V(2)(b) of the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the Convention).
7 0
The appellate court preliminarily noted that the legislative history
of the Convention was unclear. The court, however, recognized that
"[a]n expansive construction of [the public policy] defense would
vitiate the Convention's basic effort to remove pre-existing obstacles to
enforcement."' Thus, the court ruled that enforcement would be
enjoined only where it would "violate the forum state's most basic
notions of morality and justice."'
American courts had borrowed from English common law." Id. at 626 n.14.
366. Parsons Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'indstrie Do Papier




370. The eonvention is codified at Pub. L. 91-368, § 1, 84 Sta. 692 (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§ 201 (1970)).
371. 508 F.2d at 973.
372. Id. at 974. Some commentators have described this as a "pro-enforcement policy."
See MeLaughlin & Genevro, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under the New York Conven-
tion-Practice in U.S. Courts, 3 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 249, 251 (1986). England also has
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The plaintiff in Parsons asserted that the continuation of work in
Egypt under the contract would violate the national policy of the United
States because American-Egyptian ties had been severed due to the
Arab-Israeli Six Day War.
7 
The tension in relations led to a U.S.
agency's withdrawal of the funds that financed the underlying con-
tract.
74 
The Court of Appeals was unpersuaded by this argument.
The court held that any concern over foreign relations or other
"national policy" did not constitute a contradiction of American public




In equating 'national' policy with United States 'public'
policy, the appellant quite plainly misses the mark. To read
the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of
national political interests would seriously undermine the
Convention's utility. This provision was not meant to enshrine
the vagaries of international politics under the rubric of
'public policy.' Rather, a circumscribed public policy
doctrine was contemplated by the Convention's framers and
every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the
Convention, meant to subscribe to this supranational empha-
sis.376
More importantly, while Parsons stated that some claims may not be
subject to arbitration because of their stong ties to "national interests,"
even these exceptions have been narrowed in the international con-
text.
377
The very narrow nature of the public policy exception is also
highlighted by the decision in Fertilizer Corporation of India v. Idi
adapted a pro-enforcement attitude toward international arbitral agreements, even where the
arbitral awards are not based on a national system of law, but rather "international principles."
See Deutsche Schachthau-und Tielbohegeselischaft mbH v. R'as Al Khaimah National Oil Co.,
[1987] 2 All. E.R. 769, revd in part, [19881 3 W.L.R. 230.




377. See American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968), where antitrust claims were held not to be arbitrable. Now, according to Mitsubishi, the
Supreme Court has found antitut claims to be arbitrable, at least when such claims involve
an international agreement. ld
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Management, Inc.,3" 8 in which the court enforced an ICC judgment
even though one of the arbitrators had served as counsel for one of the
parties in two previous proceedings. 378  According to the court, such
a finding did not "rise to the level of being contrary to the public
policy of the United States."
380 
Similarly, although fraud will com-
monly nullify an arbitration agreement, the allegations in such cases are
limited to "fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself."
381
Although the foregoing decisions do not suggest a broad precedent
for the use of the law merchant, business custom, or trade usage by
American courts, the aforementioned arbitration cases suggest a
growing judicial reluctance to promote national interests when faced
with transactions involving international commerce. The courts'
apprehension has put American merchants on notice that American
courts respect the efficacy of foreign law and that international
contracts are construed with an understanding of the global interdepen-
dence of trade. The attitudinal shift toward an international perspective,
together with the incorporation of substantive UCC provisions in state
statutes, should cause both courts and merchants to rely increasingly on
international trade usages to aid in resolving disputes involving private
international agreements. This development not only would comport
with the original meaning of the UCC, but, more importantly, it would
also systematically further the development of a uniform international
law or common law of international commerce."'
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LAW MERCHANT AND
THE PROPER LAW DOCTRINE
A growing number of international commercial contracts contain
choice-of-law provisions to govern the substantive merits of the
agreement. Except for a few notable exceptions, courts in both
378. Fertilizer Corporation of India v. Idi Management, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio
1982).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 545.
381. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co,, 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967).
382. As Berman concludes:
It is the presence of international commercial custom-both normative custom and
behavioral custom (usage)-as a starting-point for judicial interpretation and for
national and intemational legislation that allows us to speak of the law of
international trade as a special type of international law.
Berman & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 274.
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common and civil law jurisdictions uphold the parties' exercise of
autonomy over choice-of-law matters.
3 3 
Even on a regional level,
the principle of party autonomy has been endorsed, as evidenced by the
European Community's conflict-of-law treaty.
3
" The question that
remains, however, is the extent to which the national courts' application
of the law merchant, custom, or trade usage usurps the intent of those
parties who have opted to have their rights governed by a specified
municipal law. It is submitted that reliance on the law merchant,
custom, or trade usage is consistent with adherence to the parties'
selection of municipal law to govern their obligations.
The first, and most significant, reason for suggesting that little
conflict would result from applying the law merchant where a specific
national law has been selected is based on provisions inherent in many
national laws. Both English and American statutory law allow for the
proof of a trade usage (custom) within their municipal law. When
parties to an international contract expressly provide that English or
American law will govern their contract, the domestic legislation
specifically empowers the courts to refer to trade usage when adjudicat-
ing the merits of each case. Numerous other nations with common law,
civil law, and other legal traditions provide for consideration of
appropriate usages or customs when resolving commercial disputes.
3 3
Therefore, in cases where a national law has been selected to govern
the merits of the disputes, such law may have a built in provision that
allows for reference to custom in rendering decisions under the
municipal law.
A second reason supporting the application of custom or trade
usage to assist in resolving transnational commercial disputes involves
those groups of cases in which the contract contains no choice-of-law
provision or where the chosen law inadequately addresses the issue
raised between the parties. In both cases, reference to trade usage or
383. Probably the most common reason for not deferring to the parties' choice is when the
contract calls for the performance or act which would be illegal or against public policy of the
forum. See generally Croff, The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration:
Is it Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L AW. 613 (1983); Note, Effecticeness of
Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy or Objective
Determination?, 82 CoLUM. L REv. 1659, 1661 (1982); Mettala, Governing-Law Clauses of
Loan Agreements in International Project Financing, 20 INT'L LAW. 219 (1986); R5sTATFMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 187 (1969).
384. Rome Concestion on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 23 03J. EtR.
COMM. (No. L 66) (1980); see P. NORTH, CoNTRcr CoNcrs, ma E.E.C. CONVENTION ON
TH LAW APPLICABLE To CoNTRACuAL OBLIGATIONS: A COWARATIVE STUDY (1982).
385. See, e.g., supra note 61.
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custom may assist in determining commercial obligations. Indeed, in
cases where national law provides no guidance with regard to the issue
at hand, custom may become the primary source of resolving the
litigation.
The third rationale that supports the application of custom and
usage in transnational agreements arises out of the "international public
policy" of relying on international trade usages and customs in
resolving commercial disputes. The United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (the Vienna Convention)
best memorializes this policy.
8 
In particular, article 9(2) states that
[t]he parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have
impliedly made applicable to their contract of its formation a
usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and
which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly
observed by, parties to contracts or the type involved in the
particular trade concerned."
7
Clearly, the application of trade usage forms an important basis in
promoting uniformity with regard to the international sale of
goods-the overriding goal of the Vienna Convention."' Article 7
of the Vienna Convention further calls for interpretation consistent with
the international character of the agreement, which includes rules of
private international law and other general principles that form the basis
of the Convention.
3
"' The argument set forth herein for revitalization
of the law merchant does not propose the abandonment of the proper
law doctrine but rather supports the principle of party autonomy in
transnational agreements. As noted by the United States Supreme Court
in Scherk:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in
which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is
. . . an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of
386. United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (C.L.S.G.),
arts. 8, 9 (Cend. 8074 (1980)), reprinted 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter UN Contracts].
387. Id. at an. 9(2).
388. Id Articles 8 and 9 of the C.I.S.G. discuss the significance of trade usages and other
conduct between the parties (or in the teade) that assists in understanding the parties' respective
eights under an international sates agreeesent. Id.
389. Id
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Predictability and orderliness are better guaranteed when an express
choice of law is made in an international contract. However, in cases
where an international contract does not contain a choice-of-law
provision, or when the chosen law does not adequately address the
issue raised between the parties, reference to customs and usages may
become an important alternative. In addition, even when the law is
chosen, domestic public policies now accept trade custom and usage as
proper and vital sources of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the time of the earliest merchants, when traders traveled the
Mediterranean, commerce was governed by commercial custom rather
than formal legislation. This led to the preeminence of the law
merchant, which reached its zenith during the time of the medieval fairs
held on the Continent and in England. The fairs were emblematic of
the autonomy granted to private businesses to conduct trade. The fairs
were organized and conducted by merchants. The merchants also
resolved legal disputes by applying the law merchant.
The advance of the law merchant and the self-regulation of the
international business community deteriorated from the sixteenth
through the eighteenth centuries due to the rise of nationalism and the
development of commercial shipping. Such developments drastically
affected merchants in that they became subject to traditional court
adjudications fraught with procedural and substantive inadequacies
when applied to the realities of commerce.
Despite the frustration of the development of the law merchant
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the goal of developing
uniform international standards has progressed in this century. The
United Nations, the European Community, and other supranational
organizations have taken the forefront in the search for uniformity by
drafting accords that govern commercial transactions. Moreover,
private arbitration has increased in the past twenty years. International
merchants have sought to utilize this system in order to avoid tradition-
al court adjudication. These private institutions, along with the
supranational organizations, have developed and reestablished a
390. Scherk v. Albero-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
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fledgling group of international principles to govern international
commercial transactions. National judiciaries can also advance the
cause of uniformity in the governance of international transactions by
more fully understanding and applying trade usage and custom when
adjudicating transnational commercial disputes. In a manner similar to
modem international arbitral tribunals, individual nations could
contribute to unifying commercial law through greater reference to
these practices. Such a development would further the growth of
international commerce.
